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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
\ ’ 
Drastic socio-economic development has tak^n place in rural China 
since the economic reforms launched in 1978. Differentiation of 
social s t ra ta and the emergence of the entrepreneurs, 
decentralization of central f iscal and planning power to local 
state organs,., and decollectivization of communes and new 
contractual relations between peasants and local cadres, provide 
the impulses for changes in state-society relations in the reform 
era • 
Unlike existing theories on state-society relations of China 
which ei ther assume a planned- or a market economy, this study-
shows that the importance of the collective sector. The 
collective sector is importajit as a f iscal base of the local 
government, provides an explanation of the conflict of interests 
between local government and central planned sector, and forms 
the locus of contestation among pol i t ica l players. 
Empirical case studies in affluent area of rural China help to 
provide new sources to deduce and support the argument. A case 
study on an affluent township in Guangdong was given. The case 
. : s t u d y i l lu s t r a t e s an emerging symbiosis relations between cadres 
and entrepreneurs, and an reinforced material is t ic orientation 
. o f local cadres. For the peasants- cadres relations, conflicts 
were observed in management of collective resources, which is 
par t ia l ly resolved by "local corporatism" by the village 
shareholding collective system. 
A theory on inst i tut ional changes, and a pol i t ica l issues and 
player model on state-society relations are suggested in the 
f inal section. 
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My interest in studying the state-society relations in post-
‘ M a o rural China originated from my personal experiences. Like 
many others in Hong Kong, my parents migrated from south China 
to the colony in the early 50s. Although 工 was born in Hong 
Kong, I remember times of paying v i s i t to my parent 's home 
village in the 7Qs and 80s. Ifc was impressive to feel the 
changes throughout the years of v i s i t s and observations. 
Those were the day in the early 70s that people liked my 
parents and me had to queue up for four to five hours across 
the border of Shenzhen. Revolutionary songs were broadcasted 
in the crowded train station, guarded by straight faced 
People's Liberation Army. Though worrying that our g i f t s and 
luggage might be confiscated, we s t i l l brought huge stuff of 
old clothes, edible oil , medicines and other things across the 
border, hoping that these could make up a l i t t l e bi t the daily 
needs of our relatives in mainland China. 
I t was always af ter dark that we reached our home village. My 
grandpa would light up the kerosene lamps. Smiles appeared on 
his face when he saw us. But we were not welcomed by all.工 
remembered the voice from a house when we were walking across 
the alleys, "Hong Kong Guests, Cleaning the Debris". A sense 
of envy and hate was casted on those who came from capital is t 
1 
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Hong Kdng and made the village unequal by giving g i f t s to 
those who have links to relatives in Hong Kong in times of 
s c a r c i t y . , 
r
 I was fortunate to be there when people celebrated the news 
that Deng Xiao-peng came back to power in 1976 and that the 
"Gang of Four" were brought down. A boy of ten years old then, 
• "S 
i t was my f i r s t time to realize about "Big Character Posters". 
Condemnations on the "Gang of Four" and cartoons on them were 
plastered on the walls around the village. People celebrated 
by lighting fire-cracker. My cousin was excited and said that 
in a short time their village would be supplied with 
e lec t r ic i ty . 
Changes in the economy from then on was drastic in the area 
around my village. My uncle and his family was allowed to farm 
on their private plot again. Pork, a rare sight before, 
started to appear in our dishes. In a few years time, 
televisions and cassette radios invaded houses of relatives 
with bougeorisie news and fashions from Hong Kong. The 
port ra i t of Mao stayed in my uncle's houses f but was 
supplemented by al tars graced by ancestors and family 
' photographs . 
From the mid-80s onwards, relatives who had started their 
business began to get richer. The town area increased and 
2 
public transport improved. A feeling of entrepreneurship, and 
modernization was observed. Nearly every time we visited we 
saw a new house of our relative bui l t . 
There has been much l i terature describing and theorizing on 
the economic changes in China in the 80s. In comparison, 
empirical , studies on poli t ical development at the local 
sett ing were quite scarce. Can there be no pol i t ical changes 
under such quick pace of socio-economic changes? As a student 
of pol i t ical development：, this is a question that baffles me. 
I would like to use this opportunity in my study to step once 
again into my home village and see what kind of pol i t ical 
changes had followed the drastic economic changes of the 80s. 
The other inspiration for my study of local pol i t ical relation 
between the state and society comes from the pro-democracy 
movement in China in 1989. China is a country with huge 
population. The majority of them are living in rural areas , In 
the 1989 movement, we saw the huge price people paid for 
fighting for pol i t ica l freedom. . However, what would this 
freedom means to the majority of peasants living in rural 
areas? Is democracy a noble, yet alienated western concept 
that only urban students and intellectuals are interested in? 
To answer these questions, we need to have, a deeper 
understanding of the poli t ical l i f e of Chinese peasants in the 
era of reform. * ;； 
3 
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However,工 realized that these are sensitive question under 
the po l i t i ca l climate In China. After years of po l i t i ca l 
campaigns, people tends to shed away from talking po l i t i c s . 
However, as a student of po l i t i ca l science I understand that 
being dis interested in pol i t ics is a po l i t i ca l phenomenon in 
i t s e l f . As a strategy, I could study the po l i t i c s of economic 
, r e fo rms - to derive analysis of local power dis t r ibut ion by 
observing the role and strategy of different players in the 
process of socio-economic development. In the past two years 
of f i e ld research, I find that experience of inquiry exciting, 
and in times, has pushed me to think hard on the pol i t i ca l 
future of China 
A case study method was applied in my study of state-society 
re la t ions in China.工 gathered general information of the 
• \ 
township 工 studied in the f i r s t stage, followed by more in 
depth interviews with people from different s t r a t a - local 
cadres of the township and vil lages, entrepreneurs, farmers 
with specialized trades, peasants, unemployed youths' and the 
elderly. 
I was lucky to gain help from a local teacher, an assistant • . - ... • • 
-for the township head, and a researcher from a county history 
research unit who provided me with useful background 
information for the local i ty under study. By a "ball-roll ing" 
approach, I was introduced to more informants. 
. 4 
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The process was by no means easy. In an interview with local 
• 、 
• cadres,工 found that cadre-peasant relat ion was a sensit ive 
issue. Off ic ials were reluctant to ta lk about information they 
consider beyond the scope of "policy propaganda". However, 
interviews with them s t i l l helped me to understand some of 
the i r perception on issues. In many cases, chating over the 
teahouse a f te r the "of f ic ia l interview
11
 might well be much 
more illuminating that the interview i t s e l f . 
After a few months of searching,工 took note of peasants' 
grievances on farm land procurement. In one case in a tea 
house,工 heard about vi l lagers gathered for a pe t i t ion to the 
provincial governor. I took the chance to go to the vil lage 
d i rec t ly and got to know a few friends. In the few months 
following, I kept informed about thei r plans and responses 
from the government on their complaints. Unfortunately, the 
disputes resulted in a violent crackdown on the peasants' 
action. Four of the ac t iv i s t s were put in j a i l .工 had to stay 
away from the vi l lage for some period unt i l the si tuation 
cooled down. 
工 n f o r m a t i o n have to be checked; against different sources . This 
.is especially true for cases with confl ic ts of in te res t s ' such 
as the land disputes and ac t iv i t i e s of profi teer ing of local 
cadres. I was able to interview the township o f f i c i a l 
responsible for planning and development； and got a fu l l tape 
5 
of the t r i a l of the act ivis ts . These has helped me to 
understand the i s s u e from the off ic ia l side as well. 
.• ‘ ‘ .. 、 ... \ . • • • ... 
To study the dynamics of state-society relations,工 chose 
areas of economic development which can shed illumination on 
the changing relations between cadres and the changing social 
players-entrepreneurs and peasants. I studied the former by 
looking into the relationship between privately owned 
enterprises and local governments at village, management 
d i s t r i c t s and township level. From there 工 gained valuable 
insights into the relations between cadres and entrepreneurs. 
This is further elaborated in chapter one of the study. 
In chapter two and three, I will review major theories on 
state-society relations and propose an alternative framework 
of analysis. This will be followed by a case study of 
peasants' mobilization in chapter four and a conclusion of the 
study in chapter five. 
6 
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| CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
•1.1 THE CASE STUDY ON TOWNSHIP X: NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
Township X (pseudonym) of County Y (pseudonym) i s located 
in the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong. The area of 
Township X spans 72 square km. where cultivated land 
takes up 52 000 mu (1) . The population of the township is 
around 100 000 in 1993. Among them around 70 000 are 
counted as rural population. 
The town enjoys geographic advantages of being the nexus 
of the west bound roads of Guangzhou to other major 
counties in the western part of the Delta. Since the Ming 
dynasty, Township X has been a prosperous market town. 
( 2 ) . . 
Township X was chosen for the case study on the changing 
state-society in rural China since the reform era for the 
following reasons： 
i . I t i s one of the areas in the whole country that has 
the greates t magnitude of socio-economic changes in the 
&0s in terms of economic growth, social s t r a t i f i ca t ion , 
and the development of market. In order to access the 
7 
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Impact of socio-economic development to ^ pol i t ica l 
development in rural China and the hypotliesis that 
follows; we chose to show case this area where such 
changes are most apparent. 
i i . The case of Township X not only provides a changing 
socio-economic backgrounci, but concrete incidents of 
po l i t i ca l mobilizations of social groupings and 
experiment-s of inst i tut ional reforms l ike village 
elections and the village collective shareholding system. 
This provides valuable opportunities to access the 
pol i t i ca l development in rural China in the reform era by 
empirical studies at local level. 
i i i . Case study in the rural po l i t i cs of China is 
part icularly instructive taking into account the 
"cellular structure" of Chinese economy and pol i t ica l 
structure. (Shue, 1988; Skinner) Although. ^ there are 
differences in the level of socio-economic development 
and decentralization, the party and governmental 
structure in township level follows a similar pattern 
throughout the country. This similarity enhances the 
generalizing power of case studies to other parts of 
Pearl River Delta of Guangdong, and to some extent, to 
other parts of the country. 
8 
i v . Access of information i s enhanced by my kinship 
network of the township. At the f i r s t round, through a 
ba l l - ro l l ing approach, 工 was able to interview 
entrepreneurs, township and village cadres, peasants and 
migrant workers in the township to get a general picture 
of the background and issues of po l i t i ca l interests . 
Since I am seen as a kin member rather than an 
academician linked to the government, informants may 
share their views more frankly•工 n contrast, those 
studies at local level which rely on collecting 
information under a guided tour of the local government 
may have d i f f i cu l t i e s of obtaining frank opinions from 
the mass• 
However, such method is limited because, information 
cannot be gathered systematically. Although interviews 
can be arranged with representative from the party 
committee of the township and some village cadres, 
o f f i c i a l permit for systematic interviews with cadres are 
not possible due to the sensi t ivi ty of the issues as 
considered by some cadres. Interviews have been turned 
down because no of f ic ia l permit has been granted by 
higher authorit ies. Furthermore, o f f i c i a l s in formal 
interview clearly stated that what they said were 
"propaganda" material for the mass, hence, not directly 
responding to the questions asked. (4) 
9 
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Under the limitation that systematic interviews or survey 
is not feasible nor desirable in some way, the 
information is, gathered by a method combining case 
studies, unsystematic interviews., cross checking of 
information, review of local l i tera ture and of f ic ia l 
s ta t i s t i c s , and also conducting comparison of the 
information collected to of f ic ia l policies and the 
national trends . 
v. In the identification of issues,工 focused on the 
changes in state institutions at local levels and also 
issues that can reflect the dynamic relation between 
state and societal actors. These included issues on 
reforms and management of village collective resources 
and village insti tutions, and the emerging relations 
between entrepreneurs and cadres. 
1.2 LOCAL STATE-FORMATION: A REVIEW OF POLITICAL HISTORY 
Local history of China are written at the county level. 
While in the past county gazette were prepared by local 
gentry, from 1991 the Chinese Communist Party implemented 
a policy of compiling local history at county levels. (5) 
The revolutionary nature of the party-state has to be 
understood' in the state-society in communist China 
1 0 
: 、 - : : . . 、 , ： . ' . ： * . . . ' • " •； . ' . . . . . . . 
I • 
- . y • I 
1 
because i t provides a wide societal base of support 气 or 
the state in the early decades of s tate formation. 
(White,. Tsou; Skocpol) I t also becomes a jus t i f ica t ion 
for the legitimacy of communist leadership today in 
China. (ibid) Since Township X is situated at. the 
pol i t ica l and economy centre of County Y, we have a brief 
review of the county's recent local history to give a 
his tor ical context for the study. 
County s administration was f i r s t set up in the Chin 
Dynasty in 214 B.C. and was established as a county in 
Tsui Dynasty in 590 A.D.. According to the of f ic ia l 
version of local history which emphasized the history of 
class struggles, peasant's revolts were frequent 
throughout the history. Locals participated actively in 
the 1911 Revolution. 13 among the 72 martyrs of the 
Guangzhou Revolt in 1911 came from the county. (ibid) 
The CCP Foshan branch was established in 1926 and 
continued to wage workers and peasants movement in the 
region. Under the leadership of CCP, the county's 
, peasant's association was set up in 1926. In 1927, more 
than twenty thousand members were recruited and 300 
branches set-up in the association, providing supports to 
the Guangdong Revolutionary Government and the Guangdong-
Hong Kong Strikes in 1927. (ibid, p.9； p.33-41) (6) 
11 
In April 1927, CCP Foshan branch went underground 
] following a crackdown by the ring-wing of the Kuomintang. 
[ The failure of. the Guangzhou revolt in 1928, however, led 
to the arrests of core party members. Local party 
ac t iv i t ies had ceased from then unti l , late 1936 when 
party ac t iv i t ies revived under the flagship of anti-
Japanese struggles . 
In 1942, the party formed a resistance armed force in 
County Y and combined leadership and membership of local 
party branch and local mil i t ia . The party-militia 
organized campaigns to reduce land and interest rates, 
and led peasants' struggles against local bandits, (ibid, 
p.102-104) After the Sino-Japanese war in 1945, the party 
act iv i t ies have to be dispersed into schools, 
governmental organs . 
During the civi l war and corruptive pol i t ics of the KMT, 
commodity prices in Foshan region inflated 20 times in 
late 1946. (ibid, p.138) 
The Communist Party responded to the situation by a two-
pronged approach. On the economic front, the CCP took the 
chance to launch the "campaign of anti-procurement" of 
. m i l i t a r y personnel, grain and taxation to gain mass 
support and cut the s^i||ort line to KMT. (ibid, p.137-
• 
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144) On the pol i t ica l f rpnt r CCP tac t ica l ly avoided 
i 
direct military crashes with KMT armed forces but 
expanded i t s propaganda and united'front with the "middle 
roaders" under the banner of "ant i - t ra i tors f an t i -c iv i l 
war/ and anti-dictatorship and state secret forces 
terrorism". (ibid, p.138) This provided a ground for mass 
support before the liberation of County Y in October, 
1949. (ibid, p.11-12; p.89-144) 
Land reform was launched and finished in March 1953 in 
the county, when land from landlords and rich peasants 
were divided and distributed to poor and middle peasants . 
(6) In Guangdong province as a whole, 80% of the land of 
..‘ landlords and 15% of the land of rich peasants were 
conscripted, came to a total of 23 million mu. Besides, 
70% of housing of the landlord class, 90% of their ox for 
fanning and 80% of their production tools and grain 
storage were redistributed. (7) 
, Land reform has strengthened the basis of support for the 
CCP from the majority of peasantry. Production in 
Guangdong increased 18% from 1949 to 1953 and 8.9% from 
1952 to 1953, giving a ground for improvements in 
livelihood, (ibid) Besides, during the land reform, the 
state could intervene into the means of production and 
even the organization of production and other aspects of 
13 
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social values. Control of arms and cul tural values wefe 
i 
taken, away from the landlords. Women were mobilized on 
po l i t i ca l campaigns and production. Cadres were also 
trained, forming the basis of local leadership. In every 
vi l lage peasants' association was formed and the i r 
membership extended to 35% of the rural population.More 
than one million civic mi l i t ia were recruited in the 
province, (ibid, p.45) 
The par ty-s ta te succeeded in penetrating into the social 
fabrics of rural l i f e in the process of land reform and 
gained popular support, This provides the ground for the 
further attempts of the party-state in extending i t s 
power in l a t t e r period： col lect ivizat ion in the 1950s, 
Great Leap Forward from 1958-59, Social ist Education 
Campaign in 1963-65, and the Cultural Revolution from 
1966. (ibid, p.58-137) 
1.3 FISCAL BASE OF THE LOCAL STATE 
A review of the f i sca l basis of the s ta te may help the 
study of state-society relat ions in the following ways. 
First , as theoris ts l ike Claus 〇ffe, James O'Connor 
argue, s ta te depends on capital accumulation for i t s 
continued survival. (8) Fiscal income provides for the 
14 
materikl base of the state. Second, the f iscal policies 
of the state outlines the relations between the state and 
different sector of industry and social s t ra ta . The more 
the state rel ies on a sector for i t s income, the closer 
relation i t forms with the sector and the related social 
s t ra ta . Tensions, coalitions, or alliances between 
sectors of state and societal players may also be formed 
in such extractive act ivi t ies of the state. (9) 
… TABLE 1.1: FISCAL INCOMES OF County Y (BUDGETARY, IN 
THOUSANDS YUAN) 
Year Total Income Collective Enterprises/ Ind./com., tax 4 
tax 
Industrial sector 
1950 6 060 310/ 310 2 360 3 700 
1955 16 190 310/ 310 8 010 7 300 
I960 23 600 3 270/ 3 080 14 140 6 190 
1965 37 560 - 4 330/ 4 240 28 310 4 920 
1970 42 750 10 240/ 6 200 27 250 5 260 
1975 62 560 6 790/ 6 100 47 380 5 070 
1978 81 940 8 340/ 6 030 60 470 5 130 
1980 86 110 5 450/ 4 710 66 790 6 130 
1984 113 430 9 110/ 6 450 93 460 6 210 . 
… 1986 201 100 7 380/ 5 370 172 920 8 560 
1988 317 640 6 260/ 6 260 245 310 10 390 
1990 420 000 * 180/ 3 000 341 110 12 650 
(Data collected from County Y government, manuscript for the County Finance Gazette, 1992; Note 
incomes for collective enterprises were negative in 1990 due to subsidy for price reform 
measures.) 
From figures of County Y Finance Gazette, we note that 
income from collective enterprises increased from 0.34% 
of total income in 1953 to 4.83% after the First Five 
Years Plan in 1957, and further to 12.78% after the 
decentralization and industrialization of the Great Leap 
Forward period in 1966 . The ratio, however, fe l l to 9.58% 
in 1978. After 1985, however, income tax and adjustment 
15 
tax were charged on collective Enterprises rather than 
.〜-demanding for prof i t share to the government. From 1988-
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1990, nearly a l l the income from this tax, or 7 . 6 million 
yuan were used up for the subsidy for the grain 
procurement enterprises during the launch of price 
reform, result ing in the low figure of income from the 
collective sector in the year of 1990. (ibid) 
However, the bulk of f i sca l income came from industry and 
commerce tax. The portion of income from different 
sectors are summarized below： 
TABLE 1.2: PROPORTION OF FISCAL INCOME OF COUNTY Y FROM 
DIFFERENT SECTORS. FIGURES CALCULATED FROM TABLE 1.1. (A 
column for other incomes is omitted, therefore figures 
may not add up to 100%.) 
Year\ Industry and Agricultural Collective 
proportion of commerce tax tax Enterprises 
to ta l f i sca l 
income ； ‘ . 
一 1950 38.9% 61.1%- N.A. 
1955 49.5% 45.1% 1.9^ 
1965 75.4% 13.1% 11.5% 
1978 73.8% 6.3% 10.2% 
1986 86.0% 4.2% 3.7% : 
1990 81/2% 3.0% Q>4% 
In 1950, before the collectivization, taxation from the 
sector of industry and commerce accounted for 38.9% of 
tota l income, less than the 61.1% from agricultural tax. 
16 
However, a f te r the drive for industrialization, the 
portion increased to 75.4% in 1965 compared with 13.1% > • .
 ：
 • 
from agricultural tax. The portion of the l a t t e r 
continued to decline to the level of only contributing 
3.0% of to ta l income in 1990. A case study by Jean 〇i 
also found that agricultural tax in Minhou County in 
Fujian declined from 31.8% of the county revenues in 1957 
to 9.4% in 1983 • showing that the trend is not limited to 
affluent region in China. (01/1988, p.18) 
I t may be argued that grain procurement i t se l f can be 
seen as a "hidden form of taxation" . "The unified 
purchase system represented an integration of exchange 
and paying taxes . . . When the price purchase and sales 
system was in force, selling/delivering grain was equal 
to paying taxes. The state purchase price scheme was l ike 
a tax rate schedule." (10) The finance section of the 
Department of Agriculture estimated that during the 
period of unified sales and procurement # the agriculture 
sector provided more than 600 bi l l ion yuan to the 
industrial sector, (11) 
From data in the county's finance gazette, the amount of 
grain procured was stable since the mid-50s. The 
agricultural tax is based on the amount of cultivated 
. 17 
• ,. ‘  ‘' .‘ . / , . . •‘ ：.•' I' % 
I ,. t . , . 
land rlestimated output, and population. (Oi, p.18) 
! 
Therefore, both from the size and the trend of government . 
revenue, local governments benefit more from developing 
commercial and industrial act ivi t ies than agricultural 
one in their region of administration. Commercial and 
industrial ac t iv i t ies not only provide more job 
opportunities and economic leverage locally for the 
government, but also increase i t s revenue directly. 
The proportion of revenue retained by the local county 
and township governinent increased af ter the reform of 
decentralization in the 80s. In Guangdong especially, a 
policy of contract system for different levels of 
government was adopted in 1985. (12) Revenues above the 
negotiated level can be retained by local governments. 
18 
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1.4 POIILTICAI； IMPLICATIONS OF LOCAL FISCAI^  AUTONOMY: 
BEHAVIOUR OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
The theoretical implications for the above findings are 
as follows： 
i.. Since the 50s, the incentive for local governments to 
develop industries and commerce are greater than that on 
agriculture, since the former generate more job 
opportunities and revenues . This finding put new light on 
the background of the campaign against "capi ta l is t 
roaders" in Cultural Revolution from 1966-1978 against 
the trends towards negligence of agriculture by local 
cadres. The po l i t i ca l campaign was used as a mean to 
control local cadres not to ignore agriculture production 
and hence hamper grain supply to the c i t i e s which was 
detrimental to pol i t ica l s t ab i l i ty . (Harding, 1976) 
Similarly, in 1992, when Deng Xiao-peng' announced that 
there was no need to distinguish the "capi ta l is t" or 
"social ist" nature of a policy where i t attained higher 
economic growth and national strength, local cadres 
interpreted this a. green l ight to relax agriculture and 
turned many arable land into "development zones". (13) 
Modelling local government as rational actors, some of 
i t s behaviour can be predicted under th is incentive 
thesis . 
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H i i . The assertion from Jean Oi (1988) that state-society 
relations can be largely revealed by the process of grain 
extraction is shadowed then with doubt. The important 
fabric of extraction from industrial and commercial 
ac t iv i t ies can never be ignored. 
According to Oi/ s thesis, the state may continue to 
extract rural surplus from grain production in the rural 
sector rather than promoting economic reforms and rural 
inciustrializatioii in the early 80s. This is true only for 
the rural areas of low levels of inciustrializatioii and 
commercialization, where the f iscal basis of the local 
state re l ies on agricultural surplus . For the rural areas 
of higher level of industrialization and commercial 
ac t iv i t ies , the state-society i s more complicated than 
the c l ien te l i s t relation described by Oi. 
i i i . From the f iscal analysis, study of the relations 
between cadres and entrepreneurs appears important. 
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1.5 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN 
TOWNSHIP X
 5 
The magnitude of economic changes in the township since 
1978 can be i l lustrated by the following figures of the 
township： 
TABLE 1 2 : GROSS TOTAL PRODUCT OF INDUSTRIES AND 
AGRICULTURE OF Township X ( PRICES AT THAT YEAR, IN 
THOUSANDS YUAN) | 
[ 
• 1 
YEAR TOTAL PRODUCT INDUSTRIES AGRICULTURE TERTIARY I 
1 9 7 8 . 4 1 9 0 0 2 2 3 7 0 1 0 2 3 0 — ； 
1 9 8 0 . - 6 7 3 4 0 2 9 4 3 0 1 3 4 2 0 ； _ — _ 
1 9 8 5 2 08 710 107 270 29 300 
1 9 9 1 828 590 593 850 86 330
 1 4 8 4 1 0 
！ 9 9 2 1 158 030 888 130 I 89 000 180 900 | 




1985 1 019 
1991 2 035 
1992 2 406 
TABLE 1.4: VOLUME OF COMMODITY SALES IN TOWNSHIP X (THOUSANDS YUAN) 
1978 21 740 
1986 143 890 
1991 570 000 
(Data before 1992 obtained from Township X government, December 
1992； data on 1992 obtained in February, 1993) 
From these figures, there has been drastic increases of 
income for peasants in the township since 1978. The 
21 
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general improvement in livelihood can also be observed by 
the increased number of concrete housing well decorated 
a l l around the township； general popularity of e lec t r ica l 
apparatus in the households including colour television, 
electronic washing machines, motorcycles； private 
vehicles for a growing number of entrepreneurs； and the 
popularity of tea-house v i s i t s round the clock unt i l l a te 
mid-nights . 
工 n c r e a s e in market ac t iv i t i e s are also ref lected in the 
figures of commodity sales. The most notable commodities 
being traded in the township included cigaret tes , ducks 
and chickens since early 80s and motorcycles and 
aluminium plates since the mid-80s. A commodity futures 
markets for valuable metals have also been set up since 
1993, 
For comparison, the growth rates for Guangdong and. China 
as a whole in to ta l product from 1980 to 1990 are 19.6% 
and 14.7% respectively, (7) while the one for Township X 
is 28.5% (8) , well abpve the national and provincial 
..V ‘ . 
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averages. ； 3 
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6 SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 
Increased market and economy act ivi t ies lead to 
differentiation of social s t rata . Social strata here is 
• 
defined as social groupings characterized by the kind of | 
occupation, relations in the management of means or 
resources for production, and whether process power over 
the means of production. According to a country-wide 13 
case study of Chinese villages, ten rising social strata 
are identified in rural China in the era of reform. 
(Chinese reading no.18, Lu (ed.) 1992： p.19) 
TABLE 1.5: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN RURAL CHINA 
Social Strata Occupation Position on the Power/control 
relation of over 
production means/resources 
‘ of production 
1. Rural cadres Community collective . Ownership (de 
management economy facto) of 
collective 
— resources 
2. Owners of Enterprises private economy ownership and 
private management management 
enterprises . 
3. Managers of Enterprises collective management 
collective management economy 
enterprises ； . 
4. Individual Enterprises individual/ ownership and 
private business management household-managed management 
(gu t i hua) economy 
5. Intel lectuals Occupations collective management 
requiring mental economy 
， input 
6. Workers in Non-agrarian collective management 





7. Agrarian Agrarian labour col lect ive management 
labourer economy 
8. Hired workers Non-agrarian private or management 
、 labour household 
enterprises 
9. Migrant Non-agrarian col lect ive management 
workers l'abour economy 
10 . Unemployed unemployed ! 
I 
Rural cadres include members of the village committee and 
party branch and key leaders of the village sub-groups. 
According to the Constitution, village committee is a 
mass-based autonomous organization. The structure of a 
village committee is as follows ： (15) t; 
( I 
I 
.GRAPH.1.1: STRUCTURE OF VILLAGE COMMITTEE/ XIANG 
GOVERNMENT OF GUANGDONG 
i 
Peasants Congress [ 
i t 
Village Committee <-- Party branch 
! I 
Head and Deputy Head--- Village Sub-groups | 
I I 
I - Coiranittee on resolving community conflicts ’ 
j- Committee on Public Order and Security f 
j- Committee on Health and Education 、 
I - Committee on Community Welfare 
j- Committee on Women Affairs 
In Guangdong, village committee refers to the parallel 
level of village sub-groups in other parts of China, or 
the equivalent of production team, or a size of about 50-
.200 households or a natural village； the administrative 
level above i t is called management d i s t r i c t or xiang 
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\ government as a representative organ of the township 
government, equivalent to the "village committee
M
 of 
other parts of China or the brigade in the commune era 
before 1980. (14) 
Income and social status of rural cadres is directly 
proportional to the economic development of the vil lage. 
In Township X in the early 90s, formal salary and bonus 
of xiang level leading cadres ranged from 800 yuan per 
month to a highest case of over 10,000 yuan- much above 
higher level cadres. ( ibid) Most leading cadres were 
already in power since the 70s working as accountants or 
other position in the brigade. Since cadres at xiang 
level take a role of representing the state interests and 
power, they play a key role in the resolution of interest 
conflicts between peasants, themselves and the s tate . 
From the 13 case studies, rural cadres only take up 1.5-
4% of the village population. (ibid： 20) In Township X; 
a village committee usually comprises a elected village 
head, a deputy head, an accountant, and in some case a 
woman representative.. The xiang government is led by the 
party branch, which is elected by the party members but 
nominated by upper levels. I t comprises of a party 
secretary, a xiang- government head who usually bears the 
role of deputy party secretary, deputy xiang- government 
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-I head responsible for economic a f f a i r s . 
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Managers of collective enterprises include the managers, 
factory head, accountant； department heads and purchase 
and marketing s t a f f . Usually they enjoy bonus from the 
enterprises . 
Entrepreneurs of private business refer to those hir ing 
more than 8 workers. Their income may be highest in the 
community but the i r social status i s ' not as high. 
Individual or household business holders refer to those 
processing technical or managing sk i l l s and relying on 
the i r own family's capital and labour. Their business 
include small industries, transportation, construction, 
commerce, catering, services, repairing and so on. In 
vi l lages of high economic development, they comprise up 
to 30% of the labour force, (ibid： 22) 
Inte l lectual labourers include teachers, technicians, 
cultural workers , medical and other mental labourers. 
Their income i s usually a few hundred yuan per month. 
Workers in collective enterprises have a dual ident i ty of 
worker and peasants holding land in the i r vi l lages . Rural 
. l abourers , on the other hand, refer to those contracting-




Agricultural production but receive low income because of 
depressed product prices. In the case studies conducted 
by Lu's team, the 日 i z e of th is s t rata f e l l from 41%- 88% 
in 1978 to 5.2- 37.6% in 1989. (ibid, p.25) 
No systematic survey on the s t ra t i f i ca t ion of Township X 
was conducted due to limit of access and resources. 
.However, a l l the ten categories of s t rata were found in 
my sample interviews in the township. Owing to the 
suppression of private business before 1978, s t ra ta 2, 4, 
7, 8 are non-existent, or only existed in a hidden and 
marginalized form then. Observations for cases, points to 
the trend that many private entrepreneurs came from the 
background of collective entrepreneurs managers before 
the reform. 
My interest focused more on the qualitative aspects of 
the emerging s t ra ta and their relations to the state 
actors• Of part icular interest is the relat ion between 
emerging economic force- entrepreneurs and the local 
cadres. In the remaining section of this chapter,工 would 
examine the relat ion between cadres and entrepreneurs in 
Township X. The relations between cadres and peasants 
will be examined in chapter four： Poli t ics of Peasants' 
Mobilization. 
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\ 1.7 CADRE-ENTREPRENEURS RELATIONS 
According to data from Township X government, collective 
sector s t i l l looms large in 1992. (15) The township's 
o f f i c ia l figures suggested that township {zheng) level-
enterprises accounted for 30.9% of to ta l production in 
the year 1992, while the shares for management 
d is t r ic t /x iang level accounted for 40.3% of production, 
village level accounted for 7.6% and private and joint— 
enterprises 21.2%. The growth rates for the four sectors 
were 43.4%, 60%, 10% and 18.4% respectively. Collective 
sector under state control account for 71.2% of to ta l 
production, not including the 7.6% from village level 
collectives . 
My informants from both the cadre and entrepreneurs 
background, however, suggested that many "collectives" 
are in names only. (16) The extent of private business 
was therefore underestimated by the o f f i c i a l figures. 
This, however, coincided with the need of cadres to prove 
the "socialist" characterist ics of the local economy. 
Private businesses in the township used collective 
enterprises license to seek support from the collective 
state unit . In such ways convenience in obtaining 
licenses, cooperations from local government* in supplying 
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elect r ic i ty and water/ access to tax exemption and loans 
could be more easily granted. On the other hand, 
management fees, or even bribes or other forms of 
benefits will be provided to the collective cadres 
involved. This ”symbiotic" relationship between private 
enterprises and local cadres take several forms： 
(A) MANAGEMENT FEES AND SUB-CONTRACTING 
This is a common practice that administrative units like 
village committees, management d i s t r ic t , and collective 
units (such as township schools) lends out their business 
license for private entrepreneurs' business to operate. 
In return, they charged a regular management fee. Besides 
the assistance for the enterprises' registration, the 
administrative unit may also use i t s network to help the 
enterprises to obtain land use rights, e lec t r ic i ty and 
other ut i l i t ies-supply. 
The practice of management fee can be seen as an 
extension of contracting out policies for the management 
. of collective resources since the dismantle of commune or 
decollectivization policies in early 80s. (Shue, 1988) 
Contracting out is seen as a means to promote 
productivity and effectiveness, in concrete terms, 
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howevet, is not clearly stipulated and hence up to local 
. in te rpre ta t ion , 
Usually/ the administrative unit has no claims to a share 
of prof i ts of the enterprises although they are under 
their registration. Under the "market" of licensing, 
enterprises can choose the administrative units which 
provide better terms. "Exit" is possible and the 
existence of competition among different administrative 
units provide rooms for entrepreneurs to manoeuvre. 
Therefore, although China is a unified state, under 
decentralization of administrative powers and 
differentiat ion of supervisory units, the state is 
divided into organs of different interests . This provides 
rooms for the emerging social and economic strata-
private entrepreneurs- to bargain for their interests . 
From interviews with entrepreneurs, i t i s also observed 
that the granting of contracts is more on economic 
consideration more than c l iente l is t , local is t networks. 
Foreign investments for joint ventures from Taiwan and 
Hong Kong are most welcome, owing to most favourable 
policies towards those investment from higher levels of 
government and the relatively larger size of their 
investment.• Moreover, foreign capital investment and the 
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technology t r a l s f e r i t may involve is one of the c r i te r ia 
for the upper! s t r a t a of the administrative level to 
evaluate the job performance of local cadres. 
Putting th is aside, enterprises from both local area or 
those from outside, even from other provinces are also 
welcomed as long as they can f u l f i l the contract for 
management fees. This support the thesis in that the 
relations between local cadres and entrepreneurs are 
defined more in contractual rather than local is t -
c l i en te l i s t terms. Moreover, in the granting of contract, 
"guanxi", or personal network, is not a necessary 
condition. 
(B) BRIBING 
Despite the trend for emerging contractual relations, 
bribing is s t i l l a common practise among the 
entrepreneurs . To fac i l i t a t e the informal network within 
the o f f i c i a l channels, private entrepreneurs often 
provide favours to local village head and party 
secretary, the "No.l man" who has decision-making power 
locally and who can l i a i se with upper authorities for 
access to supplies and loans. 
Such favours are usually provided in a form embedded in 
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a cultural context If acceptable" locally, such as the 
offer of "gif ts" during the mid-Autumn Festival and the 
Lunar New Year, offer of travel opportunities and feasts 
with valuable "gifts", "social functions" like gambling 
together, invitation of of f ic ia l s for off ic ia t ing 
ceremony which also provides valuable g i f t s as 
"souvenirs". These ac t iv i t ies have a nickname "offers for 
the local mountain gods" among the entrepreneurs . In some 
cases, the amount offered i s as much as the tax the 
entrepreneurs pay of f ic ia l ly . Entrepreneurs may regard 
this as part of the operation costs. The corruptive 
effect to the local government and cadres, however, is 
not negligible. 
C； LOAN-FOR-SHARE 
Some individuals who lacks capital but have good networks 
with leading cadres at the Agricultural bank or local 
township or management d i s t r i c t leaders can secure "bank 
loans" at favourable rates. The practise was enhanced by 
the increasing amount of deposit in the local banks since 
the 80s and the of f ic ia l policy of promoting growth by 
• private investments . Increases of deposits of local banks 
» 
and credit cooperatives a f te r 1978 can be reflected in 
the following figures for County Y： 
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TABLE 1.6: DEPOSIT FOR BANKS AND CREDIT COOPERATIVE甲工^  
County Y, 1955- 1980, IN THOUSANDS YUAN (Figures obtained 
from manuscript of Finance Gazette, County Y Government, 
December 1992.) 
Year Deposit from Deposit from Deposit from 
government en te rpr i ses v i l l ages 
finance 
1955 4 62 0 560
 4 6 0
 — 
• I960 6 100 4 960
 5 8 5 0 
1965 2 090 6 470
 1 0 2 6 0 
1 9 7 0 6 7 8 0 8 4 0 0
 3 5 7 0 0
 _ ： 
1975 4 110 12 950 51 470 
1978 6 680 16 750
 6 3 6 3 0 
1980 6 570 40 760
 8 6 6 9 0
 — 
1982 11 120 52 980
 1 4 1 3 1 0 
1984 19 450 176 610
 1 7 1 2 5 0 
1986 7 110 258 480
 3 9 3 6 1 0 
198 8 25 000 ‘ 529 770
 6 0 7 1 0 0 
1989 40 700 582 700
 7 1 5 6 2 0 
1990 21 200 732 770 734 770 
1=====4===^= = = ^ = = ===== “ 
I t i s observed that the increase in deposits from 
villages since 1980, especially af ter 1984, have been 
remarkable. This increase is partly due to the increase 
of rural incomes. However, the saving has to be loaned 
out to make prof i ts for the banks and also for promoting 
investment and accumulations• According to interviews 
with entrepreneurs, loans could be easily obtained from 
local banks and cooperatives for local cadres and 
friends, and managers and technicians of collective 
enterprises.in 1985, which become their s tar t ing capital 
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for setting up private businesses. \ 
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Thereafter, loans were more t ightly controlled af ter 
I cases of bad debts arose. C r e d i t w e r e offered limited to 
those who had assets and those who could get the 
recornmendation of management d i s t r i c t or township level. 
In that period, credit from banks were also managed under 
a sub-contract, system where lower levels of the bank 
could decide granting of credit to a certain limit as 
long as they could f u l f i l a quota of deposit for upper 
levels . 
Hence local, branch of the agricultural bank and the 
credit unit has much discretion over loans for industrial 
development. Leading cadres at the township and 
management d i s t r i c t level can also influence the bank on 
the granting of loans. Guanxi, or relations to the 
of f ic ia l s hence become an asset for capital . In some 
cases, cadresf either privately or on behalf of their 
collective unit, issue the recommendation for loans for 
a private entrepreneurs, in exchange for a share for 
themselves or their collective. 
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I . D . CADRE-ENTREPRENEURS ： ^^  “ ！ ： ; 孓 
A leading cadre of the township public security bureau 
privately estimated that over 60% of the cadres of the 
bureau are running business of themselves； and the 
portion for other departments of the government is even 
h i g h e r . He jus t i f ied their、dual role by suggesting that 
their business contributed to higher income of the 
cadres, and therefore "less incentive to accept bribe." 
The "entrepreneur" mentality of cadres were enhanced both 
by socio-economic and pol i t ica l factors in the reform 
period. As mentioned before/ a rising affluent s trata of 
entrepreneurs was emerging in the township from early 
80s. Owing to the fast pace of economic growth on the one 
hand and a lax personal tax laid on them, they were eager 
to spend for consumption. The memories of the hard days 
before the reform and the uncertain future for their 
wealth, may also push them harder to enjoy their wealth 
now. In the early 80s; local people used to say' "we 
could never predict what the communist party does next. *' 
The frequent change" of policies during the cultural 
V revolution, . and the memory of elder generation on the 
land reform; play a role in the "short-term" consumption 
behaviour of the new rich. 
35 
I ， ： ’ ： .: … . . . 
I But the new rich was eager to share thei^ ' consumption 
culture with local cadres. In early 80s, not a l l local 
cadres shared the same att i tude to market or "capitalist" 
ac t iv i t ies . According to a local teacher of "Political 
Studies", local cadres made a big difference on economic 
development. (Field interview) Even in the 90s> a few 
villages In the more remote area of the township s t i l l 
res is t private businesses. Entrepreneurs, therefore, were 
eager to build up a good relation with local cadres. 
Besides the offer of bribes mentioned before, invitations 
of cadres to restaurants, clubs and tours were common 
practise. A cadre in the party committee of the township 
government told the author, "Invitations from 
entrepreneurs for dinners seem never ending. The most 
expansive meal 工 took: might have cost over 15 thousand 
yuan for a table (15 times his monthly salary)• ”Louis 
XIV", the famous brandy from France, was drunk like 
water." Another cadre had told me this , "one hundred 
thousand yuan is like nothing nowadays. You can hardly 
s tar t a business with that. Without a million yuan you 
cannot call yourselves secure. And you don't know what 
happen next as a cadre. I t ' s good to have my business and 
a fortune to prepare for a future.
M
 Clearly, the 
emergence of the new rich has set a demonstration effect 
for local cadres. 
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1.8 RULE OF THE GAME FOR LOCAL CADRES: GET RICH FIRSf 
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•' .:,、, '- ... ‘〉： . . .， / . . . . . . ‘ . i , 
Getting rich i s not only a message from the new rich, but 
an objective promoted by central government. During the 
campaign on "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" in 1986一 the local 
guidelines for the campaign laid c lear ly that f i r s t , 
there should be any mass movement and that the campaign 
should be conducted within the s ta te and party 
ins t i tu t ions . This prevented any cr i t ic ism from the mass 
on local cadres. Second, local cadres were encouraged to 
• get r ich "with the mass" or "with the col lect ive" . 
工 n s t e a d of asking cadres to stay clear from business 
ac t i v i t i e s , cadres were asked to "set an example" to the 
mass to 丨丨 get rich f i r s t " , although they were also 
reminded to promote wealth of the col lect ive at the same 
time. (Chinese t i t l e 110. 37； Foshan Municipal Government; 
1987) 
Central guidelines on cadre behaviour may not apply to 
local levels, resul t ing in two sets of rule for cadres at 
county-or-above level and township-and-below levels . In 
1990 during the ant i-corrupt ion campaign was launched by 
. the party, the Party Central has issued a ban on running 
business and a guideline to prevent usage of luxury, cars • * . . . . . . . . • .、 • . .. 
and spending on extravagant banquets for cadres of county 
or above levels in 1990. Interestingly, these guidelines 
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did not -apply to local levels , (Chinese t i t l e no,4) fn 
a more recent commentary/ cadres at township and below 
. .> . . ‘ • 
level were asked to refer to .those guidelines. This, 
however, will be implemented by »self-examination" and 
"se l f -disc ipl ine" . Care should also be taken to take into 
considerations di f ferent circumstance in d i f fe rent 
l oca l i t i e s , allowing more rooms for in terpre ta t ion . 
(Chinese t i t l e no .56: 1995: 1) I t seems that the central 
s ta te would not l ike a clear d i f fe ren t ia t ion of local 
cadres from entrepreneurial or business a c t i v i t i e s , 
worrying th is may have negative e f fec ts on economic 
growth. 
1.9 CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 
In the above analysis, we derive from the f i s ca l analysis 
of the local s ta te that i t has a high prospensity for 
industr ia l and commerical growth. In the pre-reform 
period, th is prospensity was checked by a command economy 
and planned guidelines from above and po l i t i c a l 
campaigns . In the post-Mao period, both of these controls 
have gone， 
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Local s ta te autonomy is enhanced by a two-tier s ta te 
system. We observed that there are d i f fe ren t po l i t i ca l 
V ,, . - * . 
norms for cadres of county and above level and that for 
cadres of township and below level. This/ coupled with 
local cadres power on f i sca l decisions, tax exemptions, 
and control of loans, have enhanced the economic autonomy 
of local s ta te actors. 、 
Under these ins t i tu t ional development, behaviour of local 
s ta te actors required further study. I t i s observed that 
a strong al l iance is being formed between cadres and 
entrepreneurs in developing rural areas the reform era. 
This all iance is enhanced by their common in teres ts in 
promoting local commercial and industr ial development； 
in teres t network formed by a nominal ownership of the 
collective and payment of management fees and bribes； and 
an overlapping of membership of the two s t r a t a . 
Such all iance and converge of in te res t s may lead to 
po l i t i ca l s tabi l iza t ion in the course of market reform, 
which was part of the intention of the reformers in the 
central government- in the 80s. The al l iance may also 
explain the lack of interest of support from 
entrepreneurs to student mobilizers in the 1989 student 
movement. According to various informants, entrepreneurs 
gave very negative response to student ac t iv i s t s who 
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wanted to solicit: financial support. 
However, increase local economic autonomy of local s ta te 
I actors may not be a blessing for the peasants. Cadres 
lack of interests in agriculture, and the i r subsequent 
I abandone of farmland in the collectives, have posed 
threats to the subsistence of peasants in developing 
areas. We are going to study further the impacts of these 
changes in our case study in chapter three. 
In the next chapter, we will review, some of the 
l i t e ra tu re relevant to the study. 
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Note ： 
(1) Interest ingly, the figure on cult ivated area i s not 
included in the br ie fer prepared by the township 
government in 1993 since much cult ivated land was fi^丄ea 
up in the year and that the local government played down 
- t h e importance of agriculture when i t was development 
land markets as a " te r t ia ry industry". 
(2) CCP Party Committee, Township X (ed.), 1992. Brief 
Information on Present Township X； also from intervxew 
with the Information Officer of the committee. 
(3) Weng Jiang Zhen (ed.), 1993. Zhujiang Sanj iaozhou 
j ingJ i Shehui Wenhua Fazhan Yanjiu, Shanghai People's 
Press. (Study on the Socio—Economic Development of the 
Pearl River Delta .) , pp.30. 
(4) <New China Abstract〉， 1991, No.7, "Ziang Zen Men on 
Education.df Contempory History in China". (m Chinese) 
(5) The population of County Y in 1930s was estimated by 
the provincial governor as 272 820 households or 
1 009# 600 people. See <County Y Literature and History 
Information〉，1991, No.18, "County Y in the 1930s", p.67. 
(In Chinese) 
(6) County Y Literature and History Information, 1989, 
No. 15, p,69. The whole process of land reform.involved 
checking cases, measurement of agrable land, reg is t ra t ion 
of land-users, and education on the marriage law. (ibid) 
(7) Chinese t i t l e no.15. Hong J i (ed.) , 1991. 
Contemporary Guangdong, Vol.1, p.36-47 on land reforms. 
Beijing： Contemporary China Publisher. For a review of 
the legacy of land reform in Guangdong, see also Vogel 
E.F. (1969), Canton ijnder Communism, Cambridge： Harvard 
University Press, p.91-124. For a detai led study on the 
impact of s ta te on vil lage and family, see Parish (1978) • 
For the organization and ideology of the CCP in rural 
set t ing in the 50s and 60s, see Schermann (1968). 
(8) See Martin Carnoy, 1984, The State and Pol i t ica l 
Theory, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p.5. 0' 
Connor, James, 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New 
York： St. Martins Press. Offe, Claus, 1972. "Advanced 
Capitalism and the Welfare State," Pol i t ics and Society 
(Summer), p.479-488. 
(9) o i , Jean (1988) was among the ones who applies th is 
approach to the study of s ta te-socie ty re la t ions in 
China. 
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(10) Oi (1988), p.18. 
(11) Chinese t i t l e no.25. Ni Rui-hua (ed.), 1991. 
Research on China's Agricultural Capital. Beijing： 
People's University Press, p.12. 
(12) Chinese t i t l e no.34. Liang G. C. e t . al•, 1992. The 
Track of Rising Economy： a Sample Analysis of Guangdong', 
Economic Development, Guangzhou： Guangdong People‘ s 
Publisher, p.37. 
(13) For Deng's speeches, see Chinese t i t l e no.10. 
( 1 4 ) Field interview with 兰 xiang cadre, December 1992. 
I (15) CCP Committee in Township X, 1993. Brief 
Information on Township X. 
(16) Field interviews with cadres and private 
entrepreneurs, December 1992 and February 1993. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the issues identified in chapter one, there are several 
j aspects of state-society relations . First , we need a theory to 
I explain how the f iscal basis of the state relates to i t s 
[ ins t i tut ions and relations to the society. In other word, we 
！ n e e d a theory of state which links up structural (fiscal) 
factors to inst i tut ional factors. Different theories of state 
and class theories will be reviewed in this section 2.2. 
Second, we will discuss theories to explain the dynamics of 
the evolving social actors in the reform era is required. 
Their pol i t ica l actions may be related to inst i tut ional 
development of the state. Modernization theory will be 
discussed in section 2.3. 
Finally, we will discuss theories oil the internal inst i tut ions 
of the state, in particular central-local relations. We need 
to explain why the central state agents have allowed for 
larger autonomy of local state agents in the reform era. This 
will be elaborated in section 2.4 where theories on central_ 
local relations will be examined. 
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‘ L.2 THEORIES ON STATE : RELATING STRUCTURAL FACTORS TO 、 ’ 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
One of the most widely used def ini t ion of modern s ta te is 
given by Weber as. follows, "the modern s ta te i s a human 
community which claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical forces within a given t e r r i to ry . " (Weber, 1948： 78) 
This concept of s ta te , however, does not consider the material 
or s tructural basis for s t a t e ' s power. 
Bob Jessop, on the other hand, outlines the dia lect ica l 
re la t ions between s tate and society by the concepts of 
"hegemonic project" and "acdumulative strategy".. (Jessop, 
1990) 
Jessop defines the core of state apparatus as 
"a d is t inc t ensemble of ins t i tu t ions and organizations whose 
social ly accepted function is to define and enforce： 
collect ively binding decisions on the members of- a society in 
the name of the i r common interest and general wi l l . " (ibid： 
341) 
The concept of general will , seen by him as a key feature of 
the state, system, i s attained by the s ta te through the 
hegemonic project, which is defined as, 
"the interpel la t ion and organization of di f ferent 'c lass 
relevant ' forces under the ' po l i t i ca l , in te l lec tual and moral 
leadership' of a part icular class or spokesmen." (ibid： 207-8) 
工 n th is view,广 he state is under the leadership of a 
par t icular class. Problems may arise whether the actors of the 
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s ta te can ha如 their own i n t e r e s t s rather than a particular 
I social or economic class. I would regard that there is a 
poss ibi l i ty that state actors have their own interests . I 
would adopt the concept of hegemonic project bearing in mind 
that the 'leadership' may be staterled rather than class-led. 
!：" However, the s tate actor, although not as a direct 
I representative of a particular social class, has to face the 
I structural constriant of maintaining economic growth. In order 
j to do. that, i t exercises a particular accumulative strategy, 
defined as 丨丨a s p e c i f i c economic ' growth model' complete with 
i t s various e x t r a - e c o n o m i c preconditions and also outlines a 
general strategy appropriate to i t s realization", (ibid： 198) 
Using the concepts of state inst i tut ions, hegemonic project 
and accumulative strategy/ a functional analysis of the 
interrelat ions between state and society can be proposed as 
follows： 
FIGURE 2.1 HEGEMONIC PROJECT AS LINK BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY 
Hegemonic project: 
Moral, in te l lec tua l leadership > society 
State —……_二二二：二：二二二二> 
<
Value and normative expectations from the s ta te 
The state and society are interactive. While the state may 
provide moral and intellectual leadership, this will also 
generate expectations from societal players on the outputs and 
behaviour of the s tate . For example, in Maoist era, 
egali tarian values are generated in the pol i t ics of class 
struggles, to the extent that privileges of cadres are seen as 
class enemies of the peasantry themselves, 
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FIGURE 2.2 ACCUMULATIVE STRATEGY AS LINK BETWEEN STATE AND 
SOCIETY 1 
Accumulative Strategy： 
Strategy, for economic growth _> socie ty 
S t a t e - - - - - - , - - - - 一 一 2 1 ' : : 二 二二二二 
< _
" D e m a n d s " f r o m " s o c i a l s t r a t a and i n s t i t u t i ona l changes 
Likewise, when the state exercises a part icular accumulative 
strategy for growth, i t also generates societal demands on 
J resources distr ibution and inst i tut ional changes . For a stable 
f s tate-society relations, the functional inputs and outputs of 
the par t icular accumulative strategy should match with those 
of s ta te ins t i tu t ions and hegemonic projects. For our case 
study, the following hypothesis may be put forward： 
* The changes of state-society in China in the 
involve changes in the s t a t e ' s accumulative strategy, 
hegemonic project, and ins t i tu t ions . 
* Changes in state-society relations are l ikely when there are 
contradictions of the functional inputs and outputs of the 
s^-s js terns . A situation of dis-equilibrium a r i s e s , followed 
by sub-systems changes unt i l equilibrium is attaxned again. 
This wil l be further discussed in chapter four. 
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工NSTITUTIONALISM \ • 
I Another theory explaining changes in s ta te i n s t i t u t ion comes 
J ' from North (1981) and Nee (1991; 1990). According to North, 
"the central role of the s ta te i s to define the ins t i tu t iona l 
foundations of an economy by specifying and enforcing property 
r ights … s o as to maximize revenue in exchange for i t s 
services . • ( q u o t e from Nee, 1991:4) 
From the theory of North, we may deduce that the change of 
f s ta te -soc ie ty re la t ions in rural China since 1978 i s due to 
r economic decline. Nee (1991) , however, finds that the real per 
[ capita GNP growth ra te of China before 1978 was not low, nor 
decreasing, comparing with countries with market economy. The 
growth ra te of China for the periods are as follows.： 
TABLE 2.1: COMPARATIVE GROWTH RATES OF CHINA WITH OTHER 
COUNTRIES , 
Period Real Per Capital GNP Growth Rate (%) 
— China Japan US 
1966-70 5.6 10.0 2.0 
1971-75 3.2 3.5 
1976-80 4.6 3.9 d 
1981-85 8.4 3.5 2.5 
Data from Central Intell igence Agency. 1989. Handbook of 
Economic 
S t a t i s t i c s , 1989. Washington D.C.： U.S. Government: 
Printing Office. 
Off ic ia l data on agricul tural and industr ia l growth rates in 
the period before the 1978 reforms, suggests similar trend： 
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TABLE 2.2: GROWTH RAT^ S OF CHINA, 1952-90 
( Year Gross Output' value of Agriculture Industrial Growth 
(preceding year= 100) 
1952 115.2 I
3 0
' I I 
1957 103.6. ^26 35 
1965 108.3 60 
1970 105.8 H I '
6 0 
1975 103.1 ？ 二 . 二 
1978 108.1 ^Yc 09, 
1984 112.3 V^ n nl 
19.90 103.0 107.76 
；
 Sources： S ta t i s t ica l Yearbook of China, 1991, P-286； p.357. 
Quoted from White, 1993, p.32-33. 
These figures suggest a substantial rate of growth in the p r e - : 
reform period. Nee asserts that the reasons for social is t 
s ta te to introduce reforms cannot be explained by a simple 
model of declining growth rates, but that of a technological 
gap between the capi ta l is t and the social is t countries. (Nee, 
.1991, p.8-9) 
To conclude, under a long time span analysis, declining 
economic performances are inducements for changes in s t a t e ' s 
ins t i tu t ions . However, economic decline is not a sufficient 
condition f or inst i tut ional changes . Poli t ical decline rather 
than reforms may follow economic decline. (Huntington, 1968) 
For inst i tut ional reforms to take place, there should be 
either a change of leaders' perception and strategy, or a 
formation . of an alternative leadership. A theory on 





i . / 'j'
1
"'-'"..,.,i, ‘' '(‘ "v. .«•.、•.头•广。，厂！ ；‘ ‘ I * 
... h "‘： •’.. 
f ‘ • ] • : . . 
REGULATORY STATE I 
I • Another theory of "regulatory s t a t e " of Victor Nee (1990) 
suggest that market development in the reform period will 
t r icker more legal and regulatory development of the s tate . 
According to the thesis, Guangdong, as the province with 
丨 h i g h e r development of market- economy, should move more towards 
sett ing regulatory legal framework. 
From the case of Township X, we found that the rule for open 
bidding, and village s h a r eho l d i ng cooperative system evolved 
a s a result of economic conf l i c t s . (See chapter three for 
detai ls . ) For land requisition, a rule that the village 
collective, xiang government and township government should 
each have one third share of the land also become a rule of 
practice. Some cases of conflicts were also r e s o l v e d through 
legal means. 
However, as mentioned by Nee (1992) , a hybrid form is a better 
description of the situation as local power pol i t ics 
interplayed with the rule of law. We could not assume the 
state as a neutral player in the evolution of economic rules： 
in the context of China where local government revenue rel ies 
on .its own economic act ivi t ies , an autonomous regulatory state 
has d i f f icu l ty to evolve. Moreover, rules and their 
implementations at local levels are more or less results of 
bargaining and pol i t ical play of different players. Peasants 
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h using legal means to solve their problems faced d i f f i cu l t i e s 
[• in delays, threat of retribution, and possibly intervention by 
party cadres. The f iscal mechanism of the local state, where 
the amount of tax submitted to central government and procured 
[ from different enterprises are also results of bargains than 
rules. The notion of regulatory state are weakened in these 
sense• 
2 .3 THEORIES ON POLITICAIi ISSUES AND PLAYERS 
PLURALIST MODEL/ MODERNIZATION THEORY 
The plura l is t or group model may be used to analyze the 
emerging economic and pol i t ical changes in China. (Oi, 1989, 
p.7-8) Under the plura l is t perspective, s o c i e t y is seen as "an 
aggregate of interacting individuals socialized into cultural 
values and engaging in diverse communications and exchanges, 
especially in markets". (Alford and Friedland, p. 17) Processes 
of individual and group pol i t ical participation are the 
central focus for the perspective, (ibid, p.19) 
The relevance of the hypothesis of p lura l i s t model are 
examined here： 
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(i) Role differentiation： \ 
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TABLE 2.3 PROPORTION OF LABOURERS IN THE THREE ECONOMIC 
SECTORS ！ 
(Source： Chinese Sta t i s t ica l Handbook, 1992: 101) 
• . = = = = = ===s===p=======
= = = =
f
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
Year Primary Sector Secondary Tertiary 
















1991 59.8 21.4, 18.9 11 | 
From the table, we observe that the proportion of labourer in f 
industrial and commercial sector has increased from 16.5% of ^ 
the tota l labour force in 1952, to 29.5% in 1978 and 40.3% in ? 
1991. Occupational differentiat ion is significant. 
i 
Differentiation also takes place in the ownership of I 
enterprises. Industrial, product from collective and private ^ 
sector has also increased： t： 
• H 
TABLE 2.4 TRENDS OF OWNERSHIP 〇F INDUSTRIES 工 N CHINA: 1 
PROPORTION OF 工 N D U S T R I A I j PRODUCT ^ 
(Source： ibid： 26) 
Year State-owned Collective- Individuals/ 
owned gu t i hua 
1957 53.8 19^ 丨 
1978 77.6 22.4
 0 
1991 52.9 I 35.7 S .7 11 
工 n Township X, class and occupation groups emerged to 
supplement tradit ional groupings of kinship and. vil lage. The | 
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most notable s t ra ta are the entrepreneurs, households or 
I individual business (gu t i hu) , and| migrant labourers. 
Moreover/ the po l i t i ca l identity as members of vi l lage 
collective is aiso strengthened by i t s po l i t i ca l form and the 
shares from collective income. However, the collective 
. identi ty overlaps that of the t radi t ional vil lage ident i ty . 
The thesis on role different ia t ion in: the process of economic 
development is ver i f ied. 
(ii) Authority and privileges as outcome of social function： 
j' Authority and privileges in Township X were mixed outcome of 
j" social function and endowments. There were two areas that we 
observed endowments prevailed over social function. 
Fi rs t , in the collective dividend system, those who were born 
in a certain collective automatically receive the col lect ives ' 
! - income dividend, disregard their contribution to the 
management or the labour. The differences in collective 
incomes for peasants' households depended more on thei r 
loca l i t i e s of b i r th and hence household registrat ion, rather 
than contributions to the community. 
Second, rent-seeking behaviour of local cadres on local 
resources gave them return higher than their returns in 
accordance to their role. This kind of behaviour also caused 
disfunction of the pol i t ica l system in i t s decline of 
legitimacy. 
IA this regard,\ the authority and privilege structure in 
Township X was not ful ly "modernized". This, however, can be 
.improved by more checks on cadres power and reforms in the 
distr ibut ion structure of collective incomes. 
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( i i i ) Evolution of modern values ： comparing with pije-reform 
period, modern values of universalism is enhanced! by the 
following ways:、 …、,： 
* Emphasise on the universal applications of law rather than 
pol i t ics of class struggles. Class labels were taken away in 
the reform period. At least a formal legal procedure was 
followed in the Township X case in economic transactions taken 
by a l l part ies including the local government. A legal 
procedure was used, rather than mass campaign, on the 
crackdown of dissent‘ 
* Market reforms and contractual relations gave the parties 
involved a sense of equality and trust in the market arena. A 
sense of achievement was also promoted. Activists ' awareness 
of unfairness of cadres' corruption was based on a comparison 
between the market returns of cadres and peasants. The market 
or economic cr i te r ia provide an equal ground for comparisons 
among d i f f e r e n t groupings. In pre-reform period, cadres and 
peasants might be two categories beyond comparison as they 
belonged to different status groups. 
However, the corporatist arrangement of local collective 
strengthened the local identi t ies of peasants. Returns and 
contributions from collectives were also par t icular i s t ic 
rather than universal as they were based on results of 
bargaining then universal rules. 
(iv) Polit ical process: 、 channels for art iculations of 
individual and group interests to the party were blocked or 
mediated by local cadres. Local cadres were not impartial 
mediators for social interests as they were also players in 
the markets. Peasants had to rely on extra-ordinary channels 
and means to achieve their objectives and entrepreneurs relied 
on bribing and network-building. Polit ical process in Township 
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X did not followed the plural is t model. v 
(v) The relat ion between pol i t ical s tabi l i ty and modernization 
is more specifically postulated by Huntington (Huntington, 
1968, p.55) as follows: 
Social mobilization = Social frustration 
Economic Development 
Social frustrat ion = Poli t ical participation 
Mobility opportunities 
Poli t ical participation = pol i t ical ins tab i l i ty 
Poli t ical inst i tut ionalizat ion 
Here, the level of inst i tut ionalization of any pol i t ica l 
system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, 
autonomy, and coherence of i t s organizations and procedures. 
(工bid, p.12) The cases of farmers' protests may be used to a 
spatial analysis based on Huntington's gap hypothesis. 
(Chiang, p.44-45) The following measurements are suggested for 
the equations： 
Economic development Is measured by the national income of 
different provinces. (Stat is t ical Yearbook of China, 1992, 
p. 36) Mobilities opportunities is measured by the increase of 
social product of different provinces, (ibid, p.52) 
Social mobilization, defined as the process by which "major 
clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments 
ar% erode or broken and people become available for new 
patterns of socialization and behaviour, is measured by the 
percentage of working population working in non»agricultural 
sector, (ibid, p.102-3) The higher percentage, the higher 
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t radi t ional occupation of farming. 
The unit of analysis is province. As for the test for 
pol i t ica l ins tabi l i ty . Two measurement will be used. First , i t 
i s assumed that areas with reported cases of protests are more 
instable than areas where no cases were reported. Second, the 
cases will be divided into cases of peaceful settlement ； 
par t ia l settlements (some legal and reasonable demands of 
peasants being satisfied.)； and those resort to violence. The 
l a t t e r groups represent higher ins tabi l i ty . 
The cases from Table 3.1 are rearranged here under the above 
categorization: 
TABLE 2.5: CASES OF PEASANTS' PROTEST AND METHOD OF 
RESOLUTION, ADOPTED FROM TABLE 1. 
Case No. Location Indicator on ins tabi l i ty (1-3) 
… (Province) Settlements of Conflicts： 1-
peaceful； 2- partial； 3- violence 
means • 
1 Anhui, 1 
2. Sichuan 1 
3. Guangdong 3 
4. Sichuan 
5 . Sichuan 2 . 
6. GuangdQng 3 I 
7 . ,. Henan 3 ； 
8. Henan 2 
9 • Guangdong 3 
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10. Sichuan 2 . . — ! 
1 1 . Henan 
12 . Henan 3 . • 
.13 . . Fukien 2 
14 • Anhui 3 -
15: National 33 
to ta l = = = = = = = = = ! 
TABLE 2 6. INDICATOR OF INSTABILITY IN DIFFERENT PROVINCES IN 
1993. DATA FROM THIRD TO FIFTH COLUMNS DERIVED FROM 
STATISTICAII YEARBOOK 〇F CHINA, 1992 . 
i, r P ！ 
Province Indicator % of Total Ave. per % of ； ! 
of Populati output capita working 
i n s t ab i l i on in value of Income population | | 
ty as % the - province, (yuan) m non- ； 
t of country previous (ibid, agr icul tur | | 
national year= 100 p.36) al sector 
t o t a l (ibid, ( fcc^ga^o 
p.52) n) (ibid, I 
1 1 p.102-3) 




 _ _ 
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Sichuan ^ 9.48% 105.5 903 28.3% | 
^^nrrHnnrr 27..3% 5.56% 114.0 1 842 50.8% _ 








 _ j 
National 100% | 100% 110.2 | 1 401 40.0% ll 
Indicators of po l i t i c a l i n s t ab i l i t y discounted population (column 2 
divided by column 3)： 
n
 ; ： 1 
Province Guangdong Henan Sichuan Anhui Fukien 
Level of 4,91 4.92 2.23 2.45 2.29 
i n s t a b i l i t . j 
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To reformulate the equations of Huntington： 
Social m o b j l — n = Pol i t i ca l pa r t i c ipa t ion 
Economic development x mobility opportunities 
Po l i t i ca l nar t i c ipa t ion = po l i t i c a l i n s t ab i l i t y 
Po l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i ona l i za t i on 
Assuming the level, of pol i t ica l ins t i tu t ional iza t ion i s the 
same a l l over the country, those provinces which has 
(i) higher percentage of employment in non-agriculture sector 
(social mobilization)； 
(i i) low national income (economic development), and 
( i i i ) low increase in social product (mobility opportunities) 
has a higher propensity for peasants' protest . 
The frequency of peasants' protest , deducting the factor of 
population size, i s highest in Henan, followed by Guangdong, 
Sichuan, Anhui7 and Fukien. 
The conditions in Guangdong is characterized by high social 
mobilization, and high economic development and mobility 
opportunities (comparing with the national f igures) . 
The conditions in Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan are characterized 
by low social mobilization, low economic development and 
mobility opportunities (comparing with the national, f igures) . 
Conditions in Fukien is close to the national averages. 
The pattern here i s consistent with the model of Huntington. 
However, as the trends of social mobilization usually follows 
economic development in the case of China, c r i t i c a l cases 
could not be found. What is interest ing is that po l i t i ca l 
ins t ab i l i ty can be divided in the high mobilization-high 
growth type of Guangdong, and the low-mobilization-low growth 
type of Anhui, Sichuan and Henan. The case of Township X f a l l s 
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into the f i r s t type. 
Besides a spat ial analysis, a longitudinal analysis may also 
be suggested by Huntington's equations. Reports on formal 
protests from peasants have been rare before early 1992 
(Burns, 1988). We observed that increases in po l i t i ca l 
. part icipation i s not adequately followed by po l i t i ca l . 
ins t i tu t ional iza t ion, causing ins tab i l i ty . 
From the case of Township X# we observed that rural 
ins t i tu t ional iza t ion is incomplete. In terms of role 
different ia t ion, township government and township enterprises 
shared the same group of leaders. Cadres at xiang or below 
level were merged with the entreprenuer s t ra ta . 
However, decentralization of f i sca l and personnel power to 
local governments decreased the "coherence" of s ta te 
ins t i tu t ions . Autonomy of the judiciary and party supervisory 
organs was also hampered by party leadership at different 
levels. According to the thesis of Huntington, rural s t ab i l i ty 
can only be attained by reassert central coherent power to 
local, and to increase the autonomy of judiciary and 
supervisory organs . Autonomy of local ins t i tu t ions can also be 
enhanced by free elections of village committee and village 
shareholding collectives, 
On the other hand, . peasants in agricultural sector derive 
thei r income mainly from、、their households rather than the 
collectives. In 1991, 82.3% of rural income f a l l s into the 
category of household income, leaving 11.7% as collective 
incomes and 6% sta te tax revenue. All of these suggest that 
role different ia t ion has taken place in post-Mao rural China. 
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CLASS POLITICS 
I The notion of class po l i t i c s of Gordon White (1994, 1983) is 
I useful in outlining the policy issues for studies. White 
suggests that rural po l i t i cs will be defined by issues of the 
followings： 
a Tussle between residual collective and new local government 
ins t i tu t ions and the new quasiprivate household and corporate 
sector over resources for accumulation and consumption. 
b a rent ier or landlord state that leases productive 
resources for rents defined contractually and paid to 
collective or state agencies； 
c the r ise of class pol i t ics , pol i t ics arising from 
inecrualities between individuals, households, and groups based 
on unequal control over or access to economic resources. 
(White： 430-431) 
In the study of Township -X; issues of management of collective 
resources become one of the most te l l ing sources for defining 
state-society relat ions. This by no means suggests that class 
as the unit of social and pol i t ic actions in rural China. In 
other words; c lass - in- i t se l f rather than c lasss - for - i t se l f was 
observed. 
In the cases, peasants were mobilized along the line of 
collective members of their village or xiang, rather than the 
"peasantry class". The "cellular" structure of local s tate 
defines the t e r r i to r i e s of action and identity of peasants, 
rather than the economic class that they share. Peasants' 
action in one village rarely spread to another village, even 
through they faced similar problems (of land requisition)• 
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As for the case of emerging entrepreneur "class", they rarely 
take actions as a group. The entrepreneurs' association in 
Township X was not interested in po l i t i ca l issues. 
Entrepreneurs preferred to build up a "symbiosis" relat ion 
with some local s ta te organs to obtain land, regis trat ion, and 
other forms of inputs / under the cover of "cqllective" 
licences. Kinship network was also used in expansion of 
business• 
I t seems that the "fragmented" and decentralized local s tate 
structure, where xiang and village cadres set their own rules 
for business and compete with each others, i s not conductive 
to class actions of entrepreneurs in two ways. Firs t , 
entrepreneurs have also given rooms to obtain the i r interes ts 
by choosing the proper state patron/partners of different 
loca l i t i e s , rather than having a policy "fight 丨  with a 
par t icular s tate organ. Second, since state regulations were 
loosely followed by the locals. There were discretion and 
rooms for local governments to interpret such rules. 
Incentives and needs for entrepreneurs to form their 
association to influence national or state policies were 
lessen. 
CLIENTELISM 
The c l i en te l i s t model of Jean Oi emphasized on the 
pervasiveness of personal t ies , patronage, and informal 
influence. (Oi, p,^29) She suggests that a f te r the reforms 
"the power that cadres have over peasants is no longer direct 
but informal, created by their influence over economic 
60 
• ' ...、. ^ • .、. 
I . . . . I ...:.:..:“ 
1 
opportunities . “ (ibid, p. 232) "New patrons have emerged, often 
at village level/ and new resources underpin clientelist 
politics." (ibid) 
I In o i ' s discussion of clients, a distinction between "specific 
exchange" and "generalized exchange" is made, (ibid, p.148) 
Only those offer "generalized exchange" with the patron can be 
classified as clients. Can such pattern of clientenist 
relations be found in the Township X cases? 
In the case of Township X: peasants have emerged into 亡he 
strata of peasants/ gu t i hu; and entrepreneurs. Their 
relations with local cadres differed. Since local cadres no 
longer have direct managerial function on production after 
reforms, their； relations with peasants had become more 
detached. Since political campaigns against local cadres had 
ceased, the need for local cadres to build up "clients" or 
activists to protect themselves or to lead the campaigns have 
also been weakened. Cadre-peasants relations are better 
described as detached rather than clientelist where regular 
informal exchanges take place. 
Local cadres may provide favours to relatives or those who 
offer bribes or favour in other, terms. A clientelist relation 
may better be used to described cadres' relations with the 
emerging entrepreneurs and gu t i hu. However, in the strong 
sense of clientelist relation, power dependency of the client 
on the patron is emphasized. Since entrepreneurs have 
opportunities of "exit" and to choose their "patron", their 
power dependency oil a particular patron is weakened. This 
distinct from the peasants of the pre-reform period where 
their work, income, and grain intakes had to rely on one 
single political community. Moreover, the kincj of exchange 
between entrepreneurs and local cadres were more economical 
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I than poajltical. Cadres did not have to seek po l i t i ca l support 
！ from entrepreneurs. Their exchanges may been seen as 
"particular" rather than "generalized". In th is sense 
！ e n t r e p r e n e u r s cannot be regarded as cl ients in the strong 
sense of the term. 
The thesis of the "clientelism" or "neo-traditionalism" on 
communist s tate-society relations can be reviewed in the 
negation sense. (Walder, 1988) The theory postulates that the 
structure of s ta te control in communist countries rely on both 
po l i t i ca l and economic dependency. Personal networks between 
s ta te agents and societal players at grassroots level play an 
important role in maintaining state control. In other words, 
communist rule is not rel ied on terror or faceless state 
bureaucracy/ I t s s t ab i l i ty and legitimacy re l i e s more on 
economic dependency of societal players and their 
personalist ic network with local state agents. 
To put is in another form. If the c l ien te l i s t network at local 
level is weakened, as argued before, legitimacy of the party-
s ta te also erodes. The state may have to resort to more 
"tradit ional" means of high hand repression. This i s what we 
observed in the cases of peasant mobilization and state 
interventions in land disputes in Township X. The c l i en te l i s t 
image of communist rule is hence verified in Township X in i t s 
negation sense. 
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2.4 THEORIES ON INTERl^ Ii INSTITUTIONS OF STATE 
t,.--
LOCAL CORPORATISM 
I The notion of local corporatism is used by both Jean Ol and 
I victor Nee in their la ter works. I t is used because the local 
I s t a t e in the reform era have strong relations with local 
enterprises , The local state manages and run enterprises, and 
} provides license, loans, tax cuts and other forms of 
protection to others. Besides enterprises, the local state 
also divided the land rent and interests among different 
I levels of government and the village collective. Peasants and 
entrepreneurs' i n t e r e s t s are incorporated in this sense. 
_:. “ ‘ ....... 
I According to Schmitter, "corporatism can be defined as a 
I system of interest representation in which the constituent 
I units are organized into a： limited number of angular , 
I compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories , recognized or ^censed 
t (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
I representational monopoly within their respective categorxes 
I in exchange for observing certain controls on their selectxon 
o f leaders and articulation of demands and supports." 
(Schmitter, 1974, p.93-4) 
I T h e system of interest representation in local s ta te of China 
i n t h e cases under study, however/ i s underdeveloped. Although 
f' t h e village committee and the village shareholding cooperative 
1 system is emerging in Township X, they are t e r r i t o r i a l 
representation rather than functional representation. Although 
t h - e r e Were communist youth league, women federation, 
( entrepreneurs association and some of their leaders were 
members of the local peoples' congress. The organizations dxd 
not play a n a c t i v e political role in the local level. 
Press. 
|\ 工n Township X or County Y in general, collective form of 
H ownership and management were not part iculari ty emphasized, 
I ‘ instead, the local state pride i t se l f on the growth of the 
[ proportion of private and joint household enterprises. The 
I local s tate did not play an active role in industrial policy 
I other than a general policy of providing tax cuts, land and 
I other infrastructure to a l l forms of investments. Therefore, 
[ a l ibera l model for industrial development was observed rather 
than a corporatist one. 
If we apply the concept of corporatism in a loose sense, we 
may consider the village collectives as corporate with the 
j / elected village heads as the state-sanctioned representatives 
of peasants' in teres ts . Peasant members of the village, on the 
丨 other hand, can have a share of interest from the village 
collective. The township, having i t s own discretion power of 
I f i sca l and taxation policies, can be considered as a local 
: s t a t e . In this s c e n a r i o , Township X township's state-society 
[ relat ions are mainly liaised by this corporatist network, 
r a t h e r than a "personalistic" network as suggested by the 
clientelism model. 
DECLINING CENTRAL STATE CAPACITY 
Wang and Hu (1994) finds that the policy of f iscal 
decentralization in the post-Mao period has caused a decline 
o f central authority and necessary financial strength to 
implement goals of development and social redistribution. 
Income of central government declines from 31,2% of the Gross 
National Product in 1978 to 14.7% in 1992, fal l ing behind the 
ra t io of 2 3 . 0 % for the US (1989) and 17.7% of India (1989). 
(ibid: 36-37) 
This fa l l in .central f iscal power was caused by a 




\ based on resul ts of negotiation. On the other hand' incomes 
V for local government (at provincial or below level) have 
re la t ive ly increased. From 1986- 1990, central government's 
I budgetary income and expenditures are about 40% of the to t a l . 
(ibid： 38) However, local government's power is further 
enhanced by non-budgetary income, which is about 95% of 
I budgetary incomes in 1989 • In this way, local incomes has four 
f i f t h of the share of to ta l income. The policy of 
I , decentralization also allow local government to make 
: discret ion on tax exemption and on using bank loans, and hence 
allow more rooms for local investments and rent-seeking. • 
(ibid： 40) 
Theoretically, Wang and Hu links up the f i sca l policy in the 
reform era on the weakening of central government and 
strengthening of local governments. The interes ts of these 
s ta te players will be therefore di f ferent ia ted. In chapter 
four, a model on central-local relations based on coalit ion 
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CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
FOR STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 
I This chapter will f i r s t discuss a multi-level analysis for 
state-society relations (section 3.1) . This is followed by 
1 section 3.2 on a theory to link up structural and 
j ins t i tu t iona l changes through the concept. of 
I "dissynchotization" (Almond and Flanagan)： Section 3.3 will 
[ : link up our concept state inst i tut ions to a theory of 
po l i t i ca l game, where the boundary of. pol i t ical issues and 
players of defined by state inst i tut ions. 
3.1 THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS ON STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 
Different theories on state-society relations have i t s 
emphasis on different level of analysis. By examining the 
state-society relations at the levels of structural-
functional； institutional/organizational； and interact ionist-
individual level , we can summarize the contributions of 
different theories discussed in chapter two as follows： 
66 
1 巧 i 瓜 、 、 ^ “ % ‘ Wi l l i；； 
,.:、:,、.:•。 . , ,, A 
table 3 \ . i theories 〇p S T A T E - s o c i e t y relat ions a t d i f ferent 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
T h e o r i e s ~ I Structural- ins t i tu t iona l /o individual/ f 
functional/ rganization mteract ionis 
systematic level t level 
level 
Tota l i ta r ia Command/planned monopolistic atomized 
nism economy； po l i t i ca l power individuals 
primitive of the state, 
accumulation. — 
Modernizati Indust r ia l iza t i po l i t i ca l individual 
on theory/ on； ins t i tu t ionaHz part icipat ing 
class di f ferent ia t ion ation； role m pol i t i ca l 
po l i t i c s of social d i f ferent ia t ion process to 
s t ra ta and s. pursue for 
functions； • in teres ts . 
rat ionalizat ion 
！ • — . • 
Ins t i tu t ion Regime of property rights individual as | , 
alism (Nee) property rights and regulatory , economic . ] , 
from planned to arrangements maximizers. 
market one； for production ！ 
competing and exchange. I 
regimes . . j 





s a n d 
economy, personalized c l ients . 
“ c l i en te l i s t 
relat ions and 
power 
dependency. ； j 
Corporatism State-led .: Functional ^ Bargaining of I 
market economy. representation incorporated 
in policy groups and 
making, | s ta te agents. |； 
Since the change in state-society relations in post-reform 
period involved a change at a l l levels, most of the existing 
theories on state-society relations f a i l to predict the change 
because they tend to assume on a part icular socio-economic 
structure. In the-pre-reform period, the structure presumed in 
those models i s a command economy. As the command economy 
Press. 
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evolved into a "socialist market economy", many assumptions of 
those models did not hold. In such cases, such models prevent 
as to see the dynamics of changes rather than helping us to 
predict and to describe the changes. 
Instead, change at state-society relations one level will lead 
丨 to conditions for changes in another level. In other words, in 
order to capture the changes in the relation, we need to 
theorize the interactions of these different levels of 
analysis . 
The other problem for most of the existing models is that the 
economic structure is either assumed as "state-planned" or 
"market", or the transit ion from one prototype to the other. 
In the Chinese case, however, collective form of ownership and 
management has always be prevalent. When state command and 
control withdrew in the period of reform, these collective 
units became a more important actor in the rural sett ing. 
Observations in Township X also suggest that tiiese collectives 
are more insti tutionalized than being phased-out in the 
t ransi t ion to market economy. These village collectives 
comprise a l l local residents, and play important part in the 
local economy. Theories on state-society relations need to be. 
strengthened and extend on these forms of collective 
management. (Ostrom, 1990) 
Press. 
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I m the following^ s e c t i o n , 工 w o u l d f i r s t examine the 
I interaction between changing socio-economic structures and 
I s ta te ins t i tut ions (3.2), then examine the contours of 
po l i t i ca l players and issues from an ins t i tu t ional approach 
(3.3). 
3.2 DIALECTICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY: A THEORY 
OF INSITITUTIONAL CHANGES 
The concept of state of Bob Jess op may be applied to study the 
relat ion between socio-economic structure and state 
ins t i tu t ions . According to Jessop, "the core of state 
apparatus comprises a dist inct ensemble of inst i tut ions and 
organizations whose socially accepted function is to define 
and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of 
a society in the name of their common interest and general 
wi l l . " (Jessop, p.341) 
Comparing with the Weberian definition, Jessop emphasizes 
ins t i tu t ions rather than individual players. Moreover, the 
notion 推 "gene r a l will"- is emphasized rather than the 
"monopoly of forces"• Jessop suggests that this would "puts 
the contradictions and dilemmas necessarily involved irl 
po l i t i ca l discourse at the heart of the work of the state". 
(ibid.) "Moreover, the claims of general will or common 
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interest are a key feature of\the state system and distinguish 
i t from straightforward pol i t ical domination or violent 
oppression". 
(ibid) 
The concept of""general will" is further elaborated by the— 
concept of "hegemonic project"/ which is defined as "the 
} interpellat ion and organization of different 'c lass relevant' 
forces under the 'pol i t ica l , intel lectual and moral 
I leadership' of a particular class or spokesmen.“ (Jessop, 
p.207-8) 
jessop relates state inst i tut ion to socio-economic structure 
b y the concept of accumulative strategy, defined as "a 
specific economic 'growth model' complete with i t s various 
extra-economic preconditions and also outlines a general 
strategy appropriate to i t s realization". (Je&sop, p.198) 
Applying these concepts from Jessop, we may postulate the 
followings, 
* The state has changed i t s accumulative strategy in the post-
Mao period, characterized by a higher reliance on individual 
material incentives and market mechanism to resolve economic 
problems. (structural level) 
* Such change was caused by a change in^ leader coalition 
building and leadership strategy, which capture the 
contradictions of pre-reform accumulative strategy‘ 
* inst i tut ional changes, like decentralization of powers to 
the locals, and also changes in hegemonic proDects, like 
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denouncing class struggle in favour of s t ab i l i t y and economic 
growth, ( ins t i tu t ional levfel) follows the changes m 
accumulative strategy. 
* The resultant s ta te ins t i tu t ions and ideology have thei r 
impacts to the individual s tate and societal actors, wno 
in terac ts under the boundaries of new ins t i tu t ions and value 
sets . (individual level) 
* Their consequently interactions, however, feedback^ into the 
ins t i tu t ions and causing further changes. (unstitutiona丄 
level)‘ 
TABLE 3.2 C H A N G E S IN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN POST-MAO ；; 
PERIOD 
1955- 1978 1978- 1994 
Accumulative Planned economy rel ied on Social ist market economy； 
t t r a t eg? mobilization of local market exchanges among 
resources; grain procurement col lect ive and private 
and scissors pricing to enterprises with s ta te ^ f 
subsidize industr ia l izat ion interventions； rural economy 
evolves into township » 
economy in coastal areas . | ‘, ” • • • • • ‘ » 
State Communes following Decentralization of central | i 
Ins t i tu t ions mobilizational objectives of powers to the local. 
ins t i tu t ions c o m m a n d f r 0 m the top： Taxation and f i sca l system 3 
integrated party- s ta te and based on bargaining and i ！ 
society/economic function at contract agreement, 
local level； three t i e r Increased dispari ty among j 
system of responsibi l i t ies d i f ferent loca l i t i e s . Short-
with production team and term behaviour of local 、 
brigade at local levels. governments competing with j 
Class labels for role each others for growth. ； 
casting for actors. Local government has ei ther ^ 
Cl iente l i s t informal predatory or protective role | 
re lat ions to enterprises, depending on
 5 
• ) the level of economic/market j 
development. (Bryd) , 
Hegemony Pol i t ics of class struggles； S tab i l i ty and unity. Cease ； 
Proiect mobiUzation。f po l i t i ca l 。f class struggle. "Early ！ 
campaigns for economic stage of socialism . 
goals； soc ia l i s t morality? Pragmatism and seen t ruth 
egalitarianismr. t ransi t ion from fac ts . Economic _ 
from socialism to communism development and materia丄 
(fear of reverting to pre- rewards as basis of 
revolution capitalism) legitimacy. IS 
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CAUSES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CONTRADICTIONS AND COALITION 
FORMATION 1 
What caused th 白 changes in accumulative strategy, s ta te 
ins t i tu t ions and the hegemony project from 1 9 7 8 onwards? Both 
the neo-Marxist tReory of Jessop and the ins t i tu t ional theory 
of North and Nee presume that declining economic performance 
of the s ta te i s the determining factor causing changes. This, 
however, i s not verif ied by our analysis in chapter two. 
An al ternat ive explanation is given here with the concept of 
"dissynchotization". (Almond and Flanagan) My preposition is 
that when different sub-systems of the state： s ta te 
ins t i tu t ions , hegemony project/ and accumulative strategy 
confl ict with each other, change in the s ta te system is 
l ike ly . Moreover, such confl icts generate po l i t i ca l issues on 
which different po l i t i ca l groups r iva l on. Their struggles may 
conclude by changes of policies, formation of new ruling 
al l iances, and consequently changes of s tate system. 
Owing to the scope of this research, only a brief outline for 
the process of. di s synchot i z at ion for the Chinese s tate before 
1978 can be provided here .工 would discuss sources of 
dissynchotization from the accumulative strategy, s ta te 
ins t i tu t ions , and hegemony project respectively. 
Accumulative strategy： Since the period of Great Leap Forward, 
management of enterprises and industries have of decentralized 
to local levels . From the 70s, local "five small industries" 
have also be promoted. (Riskin, 1991； Chinese reading no.17, 
Vol.II, p.70) This provided a basis for localized, collective 
based economy. Many personnel and technology of growing "rural 
enterprises" sector in the 80s also originated from thei r 
industr ies. (Byrd and Lin, 1992) 
Press. 
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According to o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , there\ were over 50,000 
commune enterprises in Guangdong in 1958, with a to ta l product 
of over one bUl ion yuan and 17.24% of to ta l industr ia l 
product. However, the trend was arrested by the po l i t i c a l 
movement during Cultural Revolution against, "cap i ta l i s t 
roaders". (Chinese reading no. 15, Vol. I, p.462,) • 
The emerging trend of collect ive industr ies, supported with 
local governmentsv conflicted with the central pol icies which 
emphasized with grain procurement from locals . This conf l ic ts 
emerged in a po l i t i ca l form of "an t i - cap i t a l i s t roaders" at 
local and central level during the Cultural Revolution. 
State Institutions： The commune system before 1978 was a 
command and mobilization system‘ In a purely planned economy, 
the commune system may be useful in transmitted central 
d i rec t ives into local pol ic ies . However, i t s effectiveness 
re l ied on a system that both local cadres and peasants were 
under control： the former, by po l i t i c a l campaigns and the 
l a t t e r by the household regis t ra t ion system and the s ta te 
monopoly for grain procurement and sale. 
Such controls, however, contradicts with needs of the 
col lect ive sector for a stable po l i t i c a l environment and 
mobility of labour and other inputs, and also depressed 
consumption. The s ta te ins t i tu t ions were found to be too r ig id 
in the 70s and many "evading" behaviour was observed in the 
70s. (Oi, 1989) 
Hegemony project ： The contradiction between the collective and 
the planned s e c t o r in pre-reform period also manifestated in 
the hegemony proj ect• The hegemony proj ect in pre-reform 
period was characterized by class struggles. From the mid-60s, 
targets of class -struggle changed from pre-revolution land-
lord class to cadres within the party who carried out more 
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l iberal economic policies and intel lectuals . In Guangdong, the 
I campaign against "capital ist readers“, "campaign to .clean up 
cadres", "sending down of urban intel lectuals", "one strike, 
(counter revolutionary), three counter (corruption, 
f profiteering, and stealing)"campaign were carried out from ： 
1968-70. These were followed by the campaign "against Lin and 
against Confucian"in 1974； and the campaign against r ight is t 
winds in 1975, Disruption to the economy and pol i t ical 
leadership resulted from these campaigns. Their content and 
f • ideology were also against local interests of collective and 
private economy. 
CONTRADICTIONS AND COALITION FORMATION . 
These contradictions were par t ia l ly resolved by the changes of 
s ta te accumulative strategy, where local interests of 
丨 collective sector and private entreprises were accommodated 
and even promoted. The leadership changes at the central was 
supported by a strategy of "playing to the locals". A new 
coalition of power have be formed between the central 
reformers and local market reformers against the old sectors 
of planners at both central and locaL levels. The alignment of _ 
pol i t ica l forces may be elaborated as followed： 
TABLE 3.3 COALITION BUILDING IN REFORM PERIOD: 
Period Cultural Revolution Reform Period 
Ruling Central planners Central reformers 
coalition and Maoist and and local market-
local followers oriented cadres 
n o n _ Central reformers Central planners and 
incumbent and local market- Maoists and their 
orientated cadres 丨 local followers 
Press. 
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Different ruling coalition in different period have ^ifferent | 
policies on state accumulative strategy, hegemonic .projects 
and institutions； as i l lus t ra ted in Table 3. 2. The evidence 
for such coalition change may be i l lus t ra ted by the increasing 
percentage of provincial representatives to central decision- | 
making organizations, total denoucement of the Cultural 
f -Revolution, and concessions of f iscal and personel powers to 
the locals during the reform period. 
An important implication for the new coalition in the reform 
period is that the central reformers, in order to maintain 
continued support from local market-orientated cadres and 
avoid attacks from their opponents in the central, will 
refrain from too strong control on the locals. We may put 
forward the following hypothesis for our study： 
* Central reformers in the reform period, in order to maintain 
thei r ruling coalition with local reformers, will refrain from 
too strong control on local cadres' deviance behaviour, such 
as corruption and abuses of power, as long as the local cadres 
continue to implement reform policies. 
This will be tested in chapter four, our case study. 
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3.3 POLITICAL ISSUES, PLAYERS广AND GAMES \ 
\ 
Pol i t i ca l issues' and players in the post-reform period can be 
generated from the model of s ta te sub-system described above. 
This process wi l l l ink up s t ruc tu ra l - in s t i t u t iona l level of 
analysis to individual- interact ional level of analysis 
TABLE 3.3 STATE SUB-SYSTEMS, POLITICAL ISSUES, AND PLAYERS IN 
POST-MAO CHINA 
Sub-system Accumulative Insti tut ions： Hegemony 
of s t a t e strategy： Decentralization of Project： 
soc i a l i s t market- powers to local； po丄于cpa丄 
economy township s t a b i l i t y by one 
government； v i l lage par ty rule； 
committee and growth and 
co l lec t ives . improvement of 
’ E v a s i o n of control l ivelihood by 
from central or promoting 
provincial investments of 
governmental a l l p ro f i t ab le 
organs . . sectors . ： 
Po l i t i c a l Emerging social - Cadres as managers Perception 
actors strategy： of col lec t ive ^ ^ e of 
entrepreneurs； enterpr ises and actors , 
peasants as resources； cadres 1-cadres： from 
members of of leaders of moral is t ic 
v i l lage township cul ture to . 
collectives； government, xiang ma te r i a l i s t i c 
migrant government. cu l ture . 2 
labourers . -:...::.. peasants and 
entrepreneurs： 
pragmatic view 
on the s ta te , 
which legitimacy 
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Pol i t i ca l -Symbiosis" •Corruption of Suppression on \ 
issues re la t ion between cadres playing a peasants j 
entrepreneurs dual role； local protest； _ 
and,cadres； s t ra tegies to "corporatist 
contestation bypass central strategy^for 
between peasants directives； peasants 
、 and cadres on cen t ra l ' s reliance sharing o£ 
management of on local cadres to collective 
collective 丨 implement policies, incomes； 
resources, procure taxation campaigns 
especially land and other fees for against crimes 
resources； issue local investments originate from 
of control of and social market economy, 
migrant expenditures. 
labourers • = = = = ^ = = = = = ^ = = = 
Poli t ical issues in the reform era can be related to the state 
ins t i tu t ional features of the period. Accumulative strategy of 
I the reform period is characterized by decentralization of 
economic power to local state agents, who are competing among 
themselves in the socialist market economy for maximization of 
government revenue and growth s t a t i s t i c s . Such project 
generates class-based poli t ical issues： cadres as management 
of collective resources have conflicts with peasants of the 
collective and alliance with entrepreneurs. 
in our theory/ those poli t ical issues which are reinforced by 
different s t a t e s ub - sy s t em^ / inst i tutional aspects will become 
more prominent. As for pol i t ical insti tutions in the reform 
period, i t i s characterized by a bifigurated structure where 
central state power only extends to the county level, leaving 
the township and below levels of government relatively 
autonomous from state control from above. One evidence for 
th is is that code of conduct and limitation for business 
o p e r a t i o n s released since 1990 only extended to cadres at or 
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above the level of county or above. (Chinese t i t l e no. 43) For 
the level" of government below township, cadres were encouraged 
to conduct business as long as they are legal. A dual role of 
government and enterprises at this lower level of government 
i s more evidential . From the analysis of po l i t i ca l 
ins t i tu t ions , class-based pol i t i ca l issues are reinforced at 
township or below levels. 
Hegemonic project of the reform is characterized by pragmatism 
and mater ia l i s t ic values. This reinforce the awareness of 
the i r material and economic interests of a l l po l i t i ca l players 
alike： cadres, peasants, and entrepreneurs. In areas that 
" t radi t ional values" of social is t egali tarian and idealism is 
weakened, th is new perception of materialism will reinforce 
the conflict among players on the contestations of material 
in te res t s . 
To conclude, the issues of collective management of resources 
are reinforced by a l l the s tate sub-systems of reform era 
China. They are manifestated in different forms. From the 
point of view of peasants contestation for collective 
in teres ts , i t i s manifestated as issue of peasant 
mobilization. From the perspective of entrepreneurs' 
development, i t i s manifestated in their coali t ion with local 
cadres. From the cadres' side, maximization of material well-
being, coupled with the tendency to protect perceived local 
Press. 
in teres ts from provincial or central government control, 
I manifestates in the form of corruption. All three kinds of 
I issues can be identified in the case study in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR POLITICS OF PEASANTS' MOBILIZATION 
"Power holders at xiang and the township levels form their 
network and profit from land sale activities. Peasants criea 
loud when we were pushed to a dead end. Don't you realize 
these tragedies. ••‘ 
, quoted from a complaint l e t t e r to the Guangdong Governor. 
.4.1 PEASANTS‘ COLLECTIVE ACTIONS REVIVED 
Collective actions of peasants erupted openly in the early 
90s. This form of mobilization was unheard of in many years 
before the reform era. (Burns, 1988) The issues of discontent 
included local cadres' corruption and abuses of collective 
resources for private interest . According to James Scott, 
peasants are l ikely to mobilized when their basic subsistence 
are threatened. (1976) Even through cadres' corruption have 
been reported throughout the 80s, collective actions of 
peasants were only reported in early 90s when their land, 
their only mean 台 of subsistence, were procured by local 
authorit ies without proper compensation. In other cases of 
less developed areas, peasants revolted against increasing 
local levies of local governments, who also denied to pay them 
thei r grain procurement or remittance for relat ives working in 
richer areas. Reported cases of peasants' action in 1993 was 
suinmarized here in table 4.1. 
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TABLE 4.1: REPORTED CASES OF FARMERS' PROTESTS IN MAINLAND 
CHINA, 1993 (Source： Chiang, p.44) 
II Date I Location I Number I Nature of I Results
 S o u r c e 
involve P ^ s t — 
Jan. 2 Chenyu Whole S i t - i n " " " I Provincial Ch^ien-
E a r l v A hsien in""" I 1,000+ I Attacked post Zhang Ze- China 
szechwan o f f i c e s and ming ordered Daily_ 
Jan. Szechwan injured postal local govt. (Beijing 
workers to to cash a l l ) , 
p ro tes t f a i l u r e money 2.19.W 
of post o f f i ce s orders . 
to cash the i r • 
I money orders 
Jan Canton-Swatow Nearly S i t - i n to Dispersed by Tung -^
2 0 一 ^ 1 肩 l l r : 
Szechwan veteran l ev ies . | 丨 1 9 9 3 
Puchia Dist 10,000+ I Burned vehicles Resolved by Lien-h。 
May " Jenshou
0 1 3
"* ' and surrounded in tervent ion Pao. 
， 二 ？ - 二 二 。 - f g S 
s 叫 mine 二二rs ！‘ 
M i d _ N e a r L o y a n g S e v e r a l Blocked the Pro tes te r s China 
^ v hsien Honln hundred railway for 9 extor ted News 、 
May nsien, nu 、 h o u r s because of money from (Taipei) 
land dispute passengers 6.14.93 
I ' I 卿释3. L_ 
May 29 Mengchin and Several Beat cades in I Mediated by ^ 9 , f 
Y
 Meng Hsien, hundred dispute over piibUcp 6.22,93 
J j Honln j |
l a n d
I
i g h t S
 I rerson^l | 
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* ... . - . , 
June 2 Hsinho 4,000 Peti t ioned for Paralysed a Ming Pao 
v i l l age , adequate , highway for (HK) 
Chiehyang, compensation for 10 hours 
Kwangtung- confiscated land • 
May Fuchia and 10,000 Beat cadres, Gained Pao 
1 6： peltou smashed houses support from (Hong 
June 8 d i s t r i c t s , and blocked students Kong) 
Jenshou, s t r e e t s to b•丄u.” 
Szechwan protes t 
misreports in 
press . . ^ 
Mid — shi l ipu 300 Marched to Sent home； Chung-
July v i l l age , provincial 10 leaders kuo 
. Chengchow, government detamed ^hih-pao 




Late- A v i l lage in 400 . Threw stones, Surrounded Chung-
ju ly Honan seized weapons, by public . kuo 
1
 " occupied hsien secur i ty shih-
qovt. building personnel pap' 
y
 7.25.93 . 
Aug.l Haicheng, 1,000+ Protest against Some cadres ^hung- . j j 
Fukien cadres' f l ed and [ 
… exploi tat ion farmers went shin-
turned into r i o t . unpunished pao' I 1 
• 8.26.93 , 
: — ] 
Aug 3 2 d i s t r i c t s 2,000+ Held meeting to 1 5 farmers Cheng- ！ 
5
 and 7 hsiang protes t issuing and public ming f 
in Anhwei oflOUs, secur i ty j 
； bloodshed in personnel (HK), 
hsien govt. wounded Sept, , | 
building I I
 1 9 9 3
 11 
Among these f i f teen reported cases, five were related to land 
requisi t ion, five related to levies, one to misreport of media 
and two to local oppression of fellow peasants. 
There are several features".in the peasants' actions： 
i . Local cadres were the main target of protests . Peasants' 
actions expressed their discontent with abuses of local 
cadres . 
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ii； Peasants from same loca l i t ies formed the core for 
mobilization. 
i i i . Both means of pet i t ion to higher authorit ies and violent 
means to surround governmental s i tes were used to raise their 
issue, ref lect ing the lack of effective local channel of 
grievances . 
iv. In four cases, interventions from higher level (provincial 
for three cases and one from party central) were reported. 
v.工n at least 3 cases: peasant leaders were detained or 
j a i l ed . 
In our case study in Township X, disputes took place between 
vi l lage or xiang level cadres and the collective member/. 
v i l lagers respectively. We are going to review three cases. 
The case of Village A i l lus t ra ted a conflict between different 
levels of government. The village committee was dissat isf ied 
with a land deal with the township government, and launched a 
successful complaint to the county government. In Village B, 
vi l lagers used sophisticated means to organize a campaign 
against cadres' corruption and land requisit ion. A case for 
Village C from l i te ra ture review i s also given for comparison. 
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^Increases in peasants' collective actions verify the 
modernization theory's thesis of social mobilization. Peasants 
were also found to be more autonomous to take actions against 
cadres, verifying the thesis that power dependence on local 
f cadres and the c l i en te l i s t relations between cadres and 
peasants have been broken down in the reform era. Theoretical 
j . . implications of the case studies will be further discussed in 
chapter four and five. 
4.2 C A S E 〇 F VILLAGE A: CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
Under the decentralization of f iscal policies and corporatist 
development strategy, conflicts between governmental organs on 
economic issues are l ikely. The case of Village A demonstrates 
such a poss ib i l i ty . The conflict was resolved by intervention 
of higher authority at the county level and negotiation 
between the party to reach an agreement. 
工n 1982, the government of Township X bought a piece of land 
from Village A Committee near the township s i t e . That piece of 
land, however, was neither paid for or developed for ten 
years. When the prices of land soared for the decade, the 
township government t r ied to reactivate the sale by paying the 
"old prices" , Local villagers f e l t threaten and t r ied to stop 
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j . \ ‘ the move. Their complaints to higher authority received no 
response. The township government; without trying to reach a 
I • consensus, sent in bulldozers to f i l l up the farmland. Angered 
丨 f a r m e r s used their bodies to block the road for vehicles to 
I enter the s i t e . The other days, villagers found hundreds of 
armed police surrounded their village and the s i t e . 
The confrontation was video-recorded by some villagers, who 
presented their case again to the provincial government. 
The provincial government found them in a position of 
intervention then and requested the township government to 
se t t l e the deal with the villagers by negotiations. Finally/ 
the village committee and the township government made a deal 
where the former got a higher portion of rental income once 
the land was developed. 
This kind of conflicts seem bound to happen, considering the 
lack of clear definition of property rights in rural areas. 
According to the Law of Land Management of 1986, rural land 
was owned by the peasants' collective and managed by the 
village committee (Art.8). On the other hand, township-
government and enterprises can convert arable land for 
township development and construction (Art. 39) . Since 
"peasants' collectives" were vaguely defined, conflicts were 
l ikely to ar ise. A mechanism for conflict resolution was 
suggested 广 settlement by the township or county government 
Press. 
(Art. 13)I However, i t did not specified the how can conflicts 
be resolved when the township government is involved. 
t Besides land disputes/ granting of collective contract was . 
another area of dispute between peasants and local cadres. In 
a c a s e in Village A, villagers found that a least for a 
vil lage restaurant was granted at below market price. On the 
other hand, interested local villagers were denied by the 
vil lage head for open bidding for the contracts. Activists 
surrounded the house of the village head and demanded for a 
check of village accounts. The conflict was revealed to the 
township government, who sent representatives to the village 
and asked the peasants to resolve the problem peacefully. 
The contract was f inal ly open for bidding. The village head 
f e l l from power in the local election while the act ivis ts , 
with popularity gained in the campaign, won the positions of 
vi l lage head and committee members . This case i l lus t ra tes that 
local village coinmittee election provides a channel for 
po l i t i ca l participation. 
4.3 CASE OF VILLAGE B: COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR LAND RIGHTS 
Village B has about 200 households. The village was quoted by 
o f f i c i a l source as an exemplary as pioneer of reforms for 
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household contract system in the early 80s. The case or 
[ Village
1
 B, comparing with the Village A and other reported 
cases, i s d i s t inc t by i t s sophisticated means of organization 
for collect ive action. In other reported cases of peasants 
action, peasants r e l y o n arousing attention and intervention 
of higher authority ei ther by formal complaints or using 
violence： blockage of governmental offices or other forms to 
express anger. 
l n v i l l a g e B, however, an intel lectual from a neighbouring 
vi l lage was involved to plan for the strategy. In order to 
f ight back the i r land rights and stop an i l l ega l land deal, 
v i l lagers launched complaint on corruptions of the i r vil lage 
head. Media from Hong Kong was connected and an autonomous 
vi l lage conimittee and supervisory committee formed by 
elections . 
in February, 1993, peasants in Village B found that the i r 
annual dividend from the village collective were a few hundred 
yuan higher than the average amount received before. Curious 
peasants then asked the village committee accountant why the 
amount was higher than before, and found that i t might re la te 
to a sale of the i r farmland. Upon requests from vil lagers , the 
vi l lage head revealed that 250 xmi, or two third of the 
farmland of the vil lage has been sold to the township 
government in a secret deal by their vil lage head. 
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I The provisional contradt t i t l ed "Agreement on Provisional Land 
I Procurement" were signed by a representative of the township 
government, the
1
 head of the Management Distr ict , and the head 
of the Village B committee on 4th September' 1992. 
I t was stated in the contract that the procurement was based 
on the sp i r i t of the People's Republic of China Land 
Management Law, Guangdong Province' s Policy on Land Management 
and a 1991 document of the County Y government. The legal 
status of the sale, however, was la ter denied in an interview 
with an of f ic ia l of- the Guangdong Land Management Office. 
Compensation for peasants, who s t i l l have a contract for 
farming with the collective, was based on the value average 
grain production of the previous three years. Compensation for 
p a d d y f ie ld would be f if teen times of that average product, 
while that for f ish pools twenty-four times, dry land ten 
times. According to the agreement, 3 0% of the compensation 
would be released to the selling party upon signing of 
contract. The 250 mu in the case was considered as paddy 
f ie ld , with compensation for each mu fixed at 20,000 yuan. 
The tota l amount of sale income came to be 5 million yuan. One 
third of this , or about 1.7 million yuan, were released to the 
vil lage committee. However, according to the villagers, each 
of the 860 villagers of the village only got around a thousand 
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I from the compensation, leaving half of the f i r s t payment 
unaccounted for. 
According to an interview with a township development 
corporation of f ic ia l , a mu of land adjacent to the main road 
could be sold at a market rate of over 1.5 million yuan. The 
compensation was only a bi t more than one percent of the total 
sale incomes. Moreover, the tax for central government was 
less than 3% of tota l sale. The procurement of land was 
therefore a very lucrative exercise for local cadres. 
In a neighbouring village, where part of the farming land was 
procured by the township government, the sale was carried out 
in less secretive manner. - The tact ic used by the township 
.government was one of spreading threatening messages. 
Villagers in the meeting discussing the sale of farmland was 
told by their village committee head that there were no future 
for farming ac t iv i t ies if nearby land was f i l l ed up for 
industrial use and the irrigation system would then be 
blocked. Moreoverr if the peasants would not sel l their land 
to the township, there were told that "compensation from the 
county government would even less than the amount offered". 
(Field interview) 
What i s hidden from the peasants was that the land sale may be 
i l l ega l . According to Article 3 of the Guangdong Land 
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Management Policy of 1987, "permission from county level 
government or above is required for changing land usage from 
agricultural to non-agricultural purposes丨'.Article 25 ；of the 
Law on Land Management of the People's Republic of China 
st ipulates that approval was needed from the county government 
for procurement of agricultural land over 3 mu and below 10 
mu. For land over 10 mu, permission from the provincial 
authority will be required. Article 8 of the same law stated 
that "collective land belongs to the peasants' collectives, 
and is managed by the collective enterprise or the village 
committee". (Chinese reading no.1： 281-283) The township 
government t r ied to avoid such direct breaching of the law by 
stat ing that the procurement was "provisional". 
The secretive manner in handling the sale of land of Village 
B may not be surprising. In the neighbouring village where the 
intel lectual came from, some villagers had complaint on 
i l legal land sales to central government agency two year 
before the case. A working team was sent down by the Guangdong 
government as a result of the complaint. Although no 
conclusion was reached by the work team then, local leaders of 
vil lage B was alerted that the same act ivis ts might fight 
against this sale again.. 
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One of the ac t iv i s t s from the neighbouring village, Xiao Dong' 
was a sent-down intel lectual from Guangzhou in 1957, bearing 
a black five kind class label. Xiao Dong attempted ten times 
to swim over to Hong Kong during the 70s but fai led and was 
ja i led twice in labour education centre. In the mid-80s, he 
s tar ted his own business,and dropped the idea of going to Hong 
Kong. This has provided him with independent income and means 
of livelihood. 
The background for other act iv is ts who led the complaint is 
interest ing. They included, 
. a . Former vil lage leaders, accountants, in te l lectuals and even 
a party member. This group of people understood local 
procedures bet ter and could more readily find out the 
loopholes of local cadres' corruption. The sense of r ights 
were also stronger among this group. Moreover, they were the 
only ones in the vil lage who could write pet i t ion l e t t e r s . 
Finally, former village leaders and accountants were more 
authori tat ive from the eyes of follow peasants and therefore 
could be the core for mobilization. 
b. Gu Ti Hu, or family business holders' were the other group 
of people active in mobilization. Gu Ti Hu has strong sense of 
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economic rights, and their social network and exposure were 
enhanced by their experiences in the market sett ing. Since 
thei r incomes mainly came from the market, they were not 
fearful of economic sanctions by local cadres at village or 
xiang level. 
c. Peasants who are staying in farming ac t iv i t ies . Peasants 
who were s t i l l farming fe l t the most direct impact from land 
requisit ion. A woman peasant in her for t ies exclaimed, 
"without the land for farming； are we going to eat the yellow 
soil? How about our children? Without the land we have nothing 
to leave for them." Peasants have a strong sense of attachment 
to their land. The land also provided them with basic 
I subsistence. Therefore, they were ready to support collective 
action when they fe l t that their subsistence was threatened. 
Their attachment to the land was further strengthened by the 
household responsibility system since 1982. Peasants started 
to feel that they did not only have the right to use the land, 
一 … … b u t t o own i t and inherit i t for la ter generations.. (Chinese 
reading no. 34, p.372) 
4.5 BLUR BOUNDARY OF CORRUPTION 
Before complaining on the i l legal land sale, act ivis ts 
launched a complaint to the County Y Anti-corruption committee 
against the village cadres. They planned to unseat the village 
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leaders so that the "secret deal" of land sale would alsp 
become il legitimate . 
The village head, Hu, has found granting himself eight 
contracts of the village cottage in favourable terms, yielding 
a prof i t of 16,000 yuan for himself and his brother in a 
month. Hu earned from the difference of the rent he paid to 
the collective and that he received from outside renters who 
paid. the market rate . Few risks were involved in the dealing 
as those cottage were in short supply. The whole village 
received from Hu 7,300 yuan per month, or less than half of 
the prof i t of Hu. 
Several other cases of abusing cadre's power were found： i . a 
l andf i l l contract for a village fish pool was granted at 
several times the market rates； i i . cost for construction for 
a village commercial building has increased 65% from the 
contract; i i i . rental contracts for the commercial building 
expired but no increase in rent was charged to the contractors 
. despite the. r ise in market rates； iv. no vil lagers were 
informed on the sale of. their farmland. (Complaint l e t t e r 
dated March 93.) 
After receiving the complaint from the villagers, the Anti-
Corruption Committee of County Y arranged a meeting between 
the representatives of the villagers and the township 
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government at the township government building. The Committee 
concluded from the meeting that granting of contracts in such 
manner were not cases 6f corruption. The township cadres' in 
turn, warned the villagers that they should not create 
disturbances . 
Feeling that the county level authority was playing a 
protective role to the village and township leaders' the 
ac t iv is ts presented their case to the provincial government. 
A group pet i t ion to the provincial governor was organized 
around the time of a People's Congress meeting. 
Representatives of the villagers were received by the deputy 
Secretary General of the JProvincial Government, who fe l t 
sympathy to the villagers at the meeting and called upon the 
.township and city leading cadres to resolve the conflicts. 
About two hundred villagers from Village B submitted 
collectively the above le t t e r collectively to the Provincial 
Government s i te in Guangzhou. Out of their expectations, a 
high ranked of f ic ia l of the provincial government received the 
delegates of peti t ion. Showing sympathy to the situation of 
the peasants, the off ic ia l called in the leadings cadres from 
County Y, Township X and the xiang concerned that afternoon 
and instructed them to set t le the case with the peasants, 
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A 11 meimbers work group was set up on the following day by 
County Y county government. After a week of investigations, 
the result was that "no case of corruptions were found". The 
case i l lus t ra ted that even provincial government might feel 
sympathy to peasants at times, they s t i l l relied on lower 
levels of government for implementation of policies. Direct 
interventions from higher authorities were avoided. This has 
made effective independent investigation on grievances 
vir tual ly impossible . 
Frustrated peasants planned for another pet i t ion to the 
provincial governor: They said in the le t te r , 
“ Unfortunately/ the provincial government did not intervene 
this case directly, they only "sent the tigers, to be the 
shepherd, and the thieves to keep watch on the sa fe . . . ' 
.Vil lagers were desperate on the lack of grievances channels 
and the arrogant at t i tude of local cadres, • 
"When the deputy village head found that the vil lagers wanted 
to uncover his corruptive behaviour, he shouted before 
hundreds of vil lagers,” whoever complaint on me,工 woul， send 
him to prison. Go and complain me to the United Nations." 
(ibid) 
After that, a vi l lagers ' meeting was called and attended by 
m 0 r e than four hundred villagers. In. the meeting, vi l lagers 
decided to vote down the village head and deputy head and 
elected a 11 member temporary management group to carry the 
village a f fa i r s unti l further instructions from higher 
authorities or the next election. A villagers supervisory 
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committee was also set up to supervise the daily management of 
the vi l lage, 
Although the vil lage committee organization law stipulated 
that vi l lage assembly has the power to replace vil lage head, 
the Township government declared the election i l l ega l . Article 
11 of the organization law stated that： 
"Village committee i s responsible to report i t s work to the 
v i l l agers ' assembly. Villagers' assembly can be called by the 
vi l lage committee.工f one f i f t h of the vi l lagers raise the 
motion, v i l lagers ' assembly should be called. On matters 
affect ing the interests of a l l vil lagers, the village 
committee has to raise for discussion and decision by the 
v i l l agers ' assembly. 
Villagers ' assembly has( the power to remove and replace 
members of the village committee." (Chinese reading no.l, 
p.139) 
The township government broadcasted in the cabled television 
channel that people should stay away from those who wanted to 
disturb vi l lager a f fa i r s . 
Despite such warnings, another group pet i t ion to the 
Provincial government was organized. According to the 
vi l lagers , the vil lage was surrounded by aimed police the 
night before when the information of their pet i t ion plan was 
leaked out. Only around more than a hundred vi l lagers managed 
to arrive at the provincial government s i te at the planned 
d a t e . Holding the banner of "Request Governor Zhu to Receive 
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our Pet i t ion"；"Peti t ion to the Provincial Government for 
Another Time", vi l lagers keened down for f ive hours and were 
not received by any provincial o f f i c i a l s . I t seems that the 
provincial government did not want to response posit ively and 
encourage for th is kind of collective action. Public security 
guards were sent to dissuade the pet i t ioners . Villagers were 
f ina l ly dispersed by the public bureau o f f i c i a l s and sent 
back. 
This protest action provided local cadres a pretext to charge 
the vi l lagers and their leaders for i l legal assembly. In the 
early morning a f te r the pe t i t ion / vil lagers found themselves 
surrounded by around 200 armed police and public bureau 
personnel. Three ac t iv i s t s were arrested. Other core members 
of the "autonomous vil lage committee" in wanting l i s t . An 
atmosphere of horror spread around the vi l lage and others . 
ac t iv i s t s had to hide away. 
The ac t iv i s t s were charged for i l legal assembly, and were 
subsequently put before the court of the County People's 
Persecurate with the process broadcasted in the local 
television channel. 
In the b r o adc a s t e d verdict, the ac t iv is ts were described as 
those, who "wanted to get rich but without proper means" . Their. 
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V action was regarded as "threatened social order and the basis 
‘‘I jfc'U . 
of socia l is t leadership". I t was emphasized that a stable 
po l i t i ca l environment was needed for the economic reforms to 
take place. There was no mention on the causes for their 
petition： requisition of farmland. The ac t iv is ts were 
subsequently jai led for two to four years. 
On the other hand, the mass line was rei terated in the 
broadcast . The problem of local cadres were seen as a problem 
of working style rather than inst i tut ional weakness. Local 
cadres were encouraged to work in a style closer to the views 
and grievances of the mass. As for granting of contracts, i t 
was suggested that open bidding for contracts should be 
carried out to maintain a fa i r procedure. 
The tac t ic used by the local state followed closely the 
t radi t ional tac t ics of uniting the majority and isolat ing the 
minorities. An atmosphere of fear were also created around the/ 
time of arrests . News on the arrests of the act ivis ts were 
broadcasted by the local television station every half an hour 
at the peak period. A mass gathering for the formal arrests of 
the act ivis ts were also organized by the County Y and Township 
X ‘ government. All villagers from Village B were asked to 
attend small group meetings to l i s ten to the of f ic ia l view on 
the "disturbances" and to give evidence to support the charges 
of the ac t iv is ts . 
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\ Before coming to some conclusions from the case analysis, i t 
may be illuminating to compare some other reported cases on 
how the state handle rural social disturbances. 
4.6 CASE OF VILLAGE C, GUANGDONG 
On 1 April, 1994, a few public security of f ic ia l s were 
prepared to arrest a leading act ivist on an anti-corruption 
campaign against local cadres. Upon resistance by villagers, 
the o f f i c ia l s f ired arms and'injured a man. When more than 200 
vil lagers went to the public security bureau to inquire on the 
case, the bureau called for reinforcement by a few hundred 
armed police and ant i-r iot forces. They dispersed the 
vil lagers and arrested 7 people. (Express Daily, 2 April, 94) 
The conflict originated in 1991 when the government procured 
900 mu of farmland from the village. In the past three years, 
each of the 600 villagers only received 1,600 yuan as 
compensation from the village head Chen. Villagers suspected , 
that Chen was corrupted and got more than 10 million yuan from 
t h e deal. Two villagers, subsequently put the complaint to the 
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provincial government many times. An action for anti-
corruption was also formed. On March 31, 94, the provincial 
government f inal ly sent somebody to the village to 
investigate. This was followed by the arrests of the local 
public security bureau on the following day. Villagers fe l t 
that the arrests were clearly an act of reprisal against their 
complaint to provincial government. The arrest was also a 
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASES OF PEASANTS MOBILIZATION ]• • . 
工 will f i r s t discuss the changing behaviour of the cadres in 
the case, and then the inst i tut ional weaknesses in handling 
confl icts . 
4.7 MAXIMIZING AND SELF-INTEREST BEHAVIOUR OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
Most of the cases of land disputes took place af te r the famous 
••south tour" of Deng Xiao-peng calling for higher growth rates 
and bolder reform steps. A township leader interpreted the 
cal l as a green light for real estate development. 
Agricultural targets were dropped from the plan of the 
township government. This self- interest behaviour of local 
government i s consistent with the model of Liu and Hu (1993). 
Local government interpreted economic development as increases 
in revenue and profit-making act ivi t ies . They found that real 
estates" industrial development and land sales were much more 
profitable than agricultural act iv i t ies . At the same time, the 
Guangdong provincial government gave a further push by i t s 
stated objective that Guangdong would become the next "tiger" 
of Asia in 15 years time in 1992. In order to echoed the aim, 
local governments in Guangdong adjusted their objectives for 
growth higher. The only way to achieve such high rate of 
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growth, in thei^r experiences, this could most easily achieved 
• ；' \ 
by industrial development and real estates. 
As a result , "development zones" by local governments were 
developed and caused overheating. In February 1993, Vice-
Premier Zhu Rongji rang the alarm bells, saying the so-called 
"development zone craze" must stop. (SCMP/ 13 August, 1993) 
This phenomenon of central setting a high target of growth 
followed by local enthusiasm reminds analyst of the "Great 
Leap Forward" . As far as a policy is favoured by the party 
central leadership and also the practical interests of local 
cadres, i t could take place very quickly despite the effects 
on and the opposition from the peasants. 
4.8 INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS: PARTY AUTHORITY OVER LEGAL 
RESTRICTIONS 
In the above case, laws were selectively applied or bypassed 
by local cadres. Party instruction to launch "high rate of 
growth" could be a just i f icat ion for such bypassing of local 
governments on the laws concerned, which is simply regarded as 
outdated. In some other cases, local government submitted 
the i r application of land requisition by applying for smaller 
pieces, hence avoided sanctions from provincial departments. 
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I Local cadres als^ D used a strategy of implementing a project 
before seeking higher endorsement. 
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS: CORRUPTION AND DECLINE OF 
AUTHORITY OF LOCAL STATE ORGANS 
As local organs of the state take a dual role of economic and 
po l i t i ca l function, conflicts of interests arise. (Byre and 
Lin) In the above case, the township and village government 
were seen by vil lagers as taking their own profi ts in economic 
a f fa i r s rather than a fa i r arbi trator . There were also 
conflict of economic interests among different local state 
organs, like the one between the township and village 
committee. Such conflict further the fragmentation of state 
authority locally. (Zhang, 1990) 
久• 
One of the act iv is t compared his view of cadres in the post-
Mao era with those in the past' 
"even in-the time of Great Leap Forward when peasants^ in the 
vi l lage starved to death, we fe l t that we were one with the 
cadres because they worked with us and suffered with us. Now 
a l l the cadres in mind is making money for themselves and 
forqet about welfare for the others . Market ac t iv i t ies provide 
much more opportunities for corruption. In the past- we may ask 
^ o u r s from local cadres by offering a chicken or a meal. Now 
you don 't dear even make such an offer ." 
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I Off ic ia l echoed the above view! in an analysis of corruption 
ac t i v i t i e s in Guangdong in the reform era, "the principle of 
"exchange" of commodity economy has in f i l t r a t ed into party 
l i f e . Some of the party members forget party principles while 
they can only see thei r own interests , and exchange thei r 
power with money or other interests .
M
 (Disciplinary Committee 
of the Chinese Coinmunist Party； 1992, Chinese reading no. 7, 
p. 20 .) 
The study noted that Guangdong's cadres cases of corruption 
observed the following trends since the reform： 
"(i) the trend was increasing from year and year, (ii) the 
higher level of commodity economy and the more prosper a 
region, the more cases of corruptions observed, ( i i i ) There 
were more cases involving leading cadres than ordinary ones. 
Leading cadres were usually the ones receiving bribes while 
ordinary cadres were normally those offering bribes. This 
i l l u s t r a t ed the significance of "power" in such exchanges of 
money, (iv) The amount of bribe involved was increasing." 
.(ibid, p.20-21) 
According to th is report； there were 10,295 party members 
involved in corruption in Guangdong went through disciplinary 
action of the party from 1979 to 1990. Among those underwent 
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TABLE 4.2: INCREASING CASES OF CADRES CORRUPTION 
、 Percentage of corruption 
cases among party 
Year disciplinary action 
1979 41.6% 
1980 46 . 9% — 
198 1 48.6% ； 
1982 onwards More than 60% I 
(ibid, p.21) "“ — 
Therefore, although the legitimacy of the party may be 
improved by' improvements in livelihood in the prosperous area, 
i t was also erode by increasing corruptions, a more 
commercialized cadre team, and their detachment from ordinary 
peasants： a l l contributing to a decline of authority of the 
government• 
4.10 INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS : FAILURE OF GRIEVANCES CHANNEL FOR 
PEASANTS 
Cases of peasants launching formal complaints against local 
cadres t o p a r t y ins t i tu t ional has increased in the reform era. 
One reason is that, as mentioned, conflicts of interes ts and 
role of the cadres have increased in the. market economy. 
Moreover, t radi t ional means of pol i t ica l campaigns and "big 
character poster" were disallowed in the reform era, peasants 
have ei ther resort to the legal party means or to use 
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desperate method of "violence" as a form of \ po l i t i ca l 
\ 
part ic ipat ion. > 
.. . ' ,.、 .. . 
The most common form of voicing grievances is complains to the 
l e t t e r and v i s i t s department of upper levels party committee. 
This i s a reasonable means given the hierarchical structure of 
party and that the locus of local power in decision making 
l i e s in the party, rather than the Peoples' Congress though 
the l a t t e r has higher constitutional power. However, the 
mechanism of party supervision is limited by several aspects： 
* Lack of protection of peasants against local repr isa l . In 
the case of Village B cadres openly told vil lagers that those 
who complaint on him would be put in j a i l . In the case of He 
Chung, local public security force arrested those complaint 
them one day af te r the v i s i t of provincial investigation team. 
Under the very res t r ic t ive freedom of association and 
assembly, vi l lagers who grouped together and launched 
collective pet i t ion to apply pol i t i ca l pressure bear high risk 
of infringing the laws on public order. 
* Unequal assess to apparatus of legal enforcement. Although 
vi l lagers could use legal means for the protection of their 
r ights , many vi l lagers did not have the knowledge or the 
Expertise on applying those laws. Moreover, the legal 
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j problems are not solved. Local cadres, in comparison个re more 
famil iar with those laws. In some cases they were
 1
 able to: 
produce flake documents. For example, in the Village B case 
the local v i l lage head collected signatures of a l l household 
as for such signatures were collected for the sale of a piece 
[； of "wasteland" . Later on, the cadre argued that signatures 
have been collected for the sale of the good farm land. In 
other cases noted by the author, v i l lagers have d i f f i cu l t y 
finding one who can write and a r t i cu la te the i r case without 
fearing the consequences of involvement. 
Monopoly of control on media by local party cadres. In the 
case of Village B, vi l lage ac t iv i s t s had t r ied to contact the 
newspaper agencies in Guangzhou and Foshan. Response from the 
edi tors were that un t i l the confl ict was formally resolved by 
the party, they would not report i t . Their case only appeared 
in the local cable television network a f t e r the issue of-
a r res t warrant, and the i r p e t i t i o n was projected as causing 
social disturbances. 
* ineffect ive work teams. When the pet i t ion from vi l lagers 
were strong and persistent^ the standard procedure for upper 
party committee i s to send a work team to study the problem. 
T^e s tyle of work of the work teams varies from one that i s 
more serious in checking accounts to one of superf ic ia l v i s i t . 





[ conclusions especially on whether the local cadres were \ 
involved in i l legal ac t iv i t i e s . One vi l lager observed that 
nowadays worktearns are more detached from the mass, 
"They come with limousines and accompanied by so many local 
cadres. There was rarely a chance that they talk to ordinary 
peasants. Local cadres treated them with good meals and may 
present them with g i f t s on return. These contrast so much with 
the work team, who were real ly feared by local cadres, during 
the time of 60s." 
* Network of protection by higher authority. The more 
important reason that work teams were rendered ineffective in 
the network of protection by higher authorit ies . The policy of 
decentralization of local management in reform era extends to 
the handling of peasants complaints, unless i t i s a case 
real ly seen seriously by some central o f f i c i a l s . In the case 
of a complaint to the central government in Beijing, the case 
was sent back to Guangdong provincial government # and then to 
County Y government to handle. Similarity the investigation to 
Village B in 1993 was led by the County Y, which was seen of 
having good networks with local cadres in the xiang. Besides 
personal connections with upper levels, cadres at the upper 
levels have to bargain with local governments on the level of 
taxation and on implementation of policies in general. 
Therefore they were not induced to have- a very tense relations 
with local authorit ies unless a campaign was on going. 
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4.11 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: VILLAGE ELECTIONS 
Although we observe many insti tutional weaknesses in the case 
study, some of the inst i tut ional development worth our notice. 
An interesting observation in Township X is that elections at 
village committee level were relatively autonomous. In both 
the cases of Village A and B, act ivis ts who had once organized 
campaign against the township leadership were elected. 
Villagers were allowed to f i l l in their own candidates' in 
election forms from 1991 onwards. 
Subsequently, pol i t ical act ivists were able to participate in 
the management of the village af fa i rs and collective resources 
in a formal way.The public participation at village level was 
enhanced. 
Unlike the openness of village committee e l eG t i on s / the x i ang 
leadership was elected by the party members of- the community 
and their nominations need approval from higher party 
authorit ies. This poses an immediate limitation to the village 
committee power as many economic projects at local level need 
the fac i l i t a t ion of the xiang. 
Although the village committee- is not a state organ, its-
collective rights to land and collective enterprises are 
recognized by the state . Moreover/ incomes from vi l lage 
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committee were legitimate sources for peasants' welfare. In 
township X, there was an informal rule that.one third of.land 
for development would be retained for village collective. 
This, combined with autonomous elections, have enhanced the 
rooms for public discussion and decision within the village on 
collective issues . 
The other aspect of inst i tut ional development is the rule of 
law. In the cases of Villages A and B, we observed that if the 
peasants can apply legal means tactful ly, the power of local 
cadres can be checked to an extent. For example, af ter the 
campaign in Village B, both the village head and the xiang 
leaders had to quit for their involvements in profiteering and 
fines were levied on the concerned cadres. The land sale was 
put to a halt and peasants continued to farm on i t . Unlike the 
pre-reform era when the poli t ics of class struggles—prevailed 
over the rule of law, during the reform, at least a 
superficial stake to the rule of law is emphasized. 
Since the denounce of class struggle in the 1982 constitution, 
a l l individuals have their citizen rights. This is another 
area for the expansion of civic society. 
To conclude, the new base of independent economic resources 
for societal actors, elections of village committee with 
higher autonomy, and the increased emphasis on the rule of law 
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in the era of reform have enhanced the room for po l i t i ca l 
actions in prosperous rural areas in China. 
4 .12 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: VILLAGE COLLECTIVE 
SHAREHOLDING SYSTEM AND CORPORATIST MEASURES 
In the cases, economic concessions were given to the vi l lagers 
from the local government.工n Village A, the share of land 
rent income for the village committee increased. Contracts 
were open for open bidding to increase the collect ives ' 
incomes• 
In Village B and the neighbouring one, vi l lagers were given a 
piece of land for operation of the i r businesses. In Village B, 
contracts were reopened for open bidding and farmers could 
continue the i r farming on their land.工n resolving confl icts , 
local government was willing t o make material concessions to 
mobilized peasants. This, in turn, may provide the incentives 
for more peasants' collective actions. 
County Y promoted a village collective shareholding system 
from 1993 r in order to provide an ins t i tu t iona l f ramework： for 
the. welfare r ights of peasants. Under the system, . a l l the 
residents in a vil lage committee ageing between 16-60 became 
a s h a r e h o l d e r of the village collective properties. For those 
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\ ageing below 16 or above 60, they were enti t led to half of 
‘'share benefits. Therefore； a l l villagers have a dual 
membership for the village committee and also a village 
shareholding cooperative. The former is the pol i t ical 
organization and the la ter the economic one. Leaders for both 
organization would be elected. 
The major purpose for the system is to formalize and to 
clearly define the property rights of members of the village 
committee, and to provide an insti tutional structure for the 
management and decision-making of the village collective. 
According to theoreticians, the shareholding cooperative 
system is a form of collective ownership under the situation 
of commodity economy, i t is a combination of individual 
in i t i a t ives and collective form of ownership. (Chinese reading 
no. 20) 
According to interviews, however, villagers found not much 
difference between this system and the original village 
committee. They thought i t was just bearing two " t i t les" for 
the same entity. 
However, this inst i tut ional reform is a way to formalize and 
to define the collective rights of v i l l a g e committee members.： r 
This is a step towards "local corporatism"; where the state 
incorporates societal interests by formally recognizing 
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certain functional bodies as their legal representation. In 
j 
other words, potential conflicts may be resolved more readily 
within the new inst i tut ions. Social unrest may then be 
absorbed. 
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‘ CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 A SUMMARY 
This study began with a f i sca l analysis of the township 
government in the reform period. I t i l l u s t r a t ed the important 
role of industr ia l and commercial ac t i v i t i e s to local 
‘ government's revenue. In, the case study of Township X in 
. chapter one, we confirm the thesis that local government 
builds up s t r o n g all iance or syinbiosis relat ions with the 
emerging entrepreneurs in reform era. 
In chapter two and three, we argued that a ruling coalit ion of 
central reformers and local market-orientated cadres have been 
formed in the reform period. This, new coali t ion of s ta te power 
changes the s ta te ins t i tu t ions , by dismantling the communes 
and allow new autonomy of the market and farmer household 
sectors , the accumulative strategy of the. s ta te , from planned 
economy to market socialism, and the hegemony project, from 
class struggles to s t ab i l i ty and economic development in the 
reform period.. 
However, new issues of conflicts ar ise in the period, notably 
t h e po l i t i c s over control and management of collective 
Press. 
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Iresources and the control of cadres . In chapter four, we found -
r • 
that inst i tut ional development has been lagging behind 
peasants' mobilization. 
We also observed that the central government refrained from 
direct control over local cadres. This is partly i l lus t ra ted 
by the two sets of pol i t ica l norms for cadres at county or 
above level and those at township or below level. 
The rules for operating of private enterprises are looser for 
the la te r although they too received salary from the local 
government. This may be explained by the particular coalition 
and the central ' s need of support from l o c a l reformers … 
despite the fact that they may profi t from the process of 
reform. 
However, local cadres' abuses of power may threaten the basic 
subsistence of peasants. In the period of the case study in 
1993, peasants' mobilization against cadres' land procurement 
were coinmon. There were more than four hundred collective 
peti t ions to the provincial government of Guangdong in 1993, 
according to a deputy to the People's Congress-. 
In. such c i r cums t ance s , we found that peasants in the reform 
era, as predicted by the modernization theory, had more 
independent economic base for their pol i t ical actions. They 
were also more mobile in the new market order. 
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Pol i t i ca l actions of peasants were not to ta l ly f u t i l e . If they 
could apply pressure tac t ica l ly , concessions could be made by 
.、 . * 
the local governments. However, peasant ac t iv i s t s u s i ng means 
of public assembly were subjected to po l i t i ca l sanctions. 
Their s i tuat ion were part icular dangerous given that local 
cadres' abuses were inadequately controlled ei ther by legal 
means or t radi t ional means of work teams. 
One interes t ing phenomenon observed in the case study was the 
evolution of new inst i tu t ions to resolve potential confl icts 
of land use and collective resources ； From 1.991 onwards, the 
central government had promoted higher autonomy in the 
functions and elections of vil lage committees.工t was hoped 
that through local elections vi l lagers ' in teres ts could be 
be t t e r protected. 
In our case study； we found that elections -of vil lage 
coinmittee had been more autonomous from cadres' control. 
Nominations were basically open. Villagers who had previously 
organized against local cadres could s t i l l be elected. 
Although the vil lage committees were not part of the local 
government. I t , however, played a role of consultation in 
local a f f a i r s . In the arrangement of the land use of the case, 
i t also controlled one third of the farmland and managed i t s 
own enterprises whereas i t s incomes could be divided for 
collect ive members of the vi l lage. 
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L The role of peasants of the vi l lage committee was formalized 
\ 
in Township X'where the vi l lage collective system was being j 
experimented and promoted. I t i s in teres t ing to note that 
peasants ' share of collective income would then determined by 
which vi l lage she. or he belongs to, rather than the 
individual ‘ s exact output. 
The p o l i t i c a l implication for such a system i s that peasants' 
mobilization i s 丨丨cellular" and is constraint within their own 
col lec t ive . Their economic welfare is determined by the 
conduct and performances of the local cadres rather than any 
governmental p o l i c i e s . Collective actions of peasants across 
borders of l oca l i t i e s would then be unlikely, for they have no 
immediate "common enemies" and l i t t l e common policy targets 
for advocacy. 
We m^y summarize our findings in our case study in chapter 
four as follows： 
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TABLE 5.1: STRATEGY OF L^AYERS AND OUTCOMES OF POLITICAL .[; 
‘ 1 
' ！ . ... ‘ 丨 
ISSUES I 
I .. ‘ I 
Players、 Land Disputes Corruption and Development 
issues abuses of of private | 
I collective enterprises j 
J resources j 
Central/ Loose implementation Refrain from strong Promote 
provincial of land law before control of local development j 
government problems of overheated cadres for fear of of . 
p “ l o c a l expansion worsening of enterprises, ； 
I indust r ia l and relationship and but preferred ； 
commercial land from impact on market collective 
f i l l i n g up farmland. ac t i v i t i e s . Code of forms than 丨 
!j Development of conduct for cadres private ones. 
i ins t i tu t ions f a l l only extend to the Have more 
behind economic county level ' f lexible 
development； ambiguous leaving rooms for policies for 
i! a t t i tude to peasant's manoeuvre for Guangdong on 
complaint. township and lower- the 
level cadres. development 
|j of private 
Serious enterprises. 
|J investigation only 
upon peasants' 
I complaints and the 
ii "policy wind" from . 
j central government -
Delegate to 
provincial and even 章 
i! county party j 
. organs, which have 
strong local 
I network, to deal 
I with the issue. 
]j Work teams sub j ect 
|j to lobbying of 
local cadres . 
L o C a i perception change.： Increasingly using Welcome their 
cadres from moralistic to their po l i t i ca l development 
mater ia l i s t ic culture. power and market as income for 
p opportunities for collectives | 
Maximize income by mater ia l is t ic
 a n d
 s 
l! land procurement from gains, especially opportunities 
!! peasants for for leading cadres. for receiving 
i! industr ia l and Accept interests in personal 
commercial land； took "acceptable forms", gains. May 
opportunities from like the cover of offer 
, south tour of Deng for "business collective 
relaxed land policies； operations", licenses and 
pacif ied peasants by consultant fees, or other kind of 
both threats and g i f t s . support, like 
material in teres ts . guarantees 
for loans . 
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丨 | I ^¾¾ rights I ^ f I S gn^ I I 
: securi ty threatened； cannot afford “| 
launched complaints to bribes of a size 糾 … t 
higher level of that entrepreneurs di rect ly as | 
ji ipadprqhin- of fe r . Discontent most I 
mobulzat i in within on corrupted cadres employees are | 
members of same increased as | 
vi l lage collect ive. awareness。f . L f a s ^ 
” "collective rights" other areas. ^ 
for material Pollution ？ 
benefit increased. from :: 
Unlikely to have enterprises 
mass mobilization may affect 
unless thei r basic their farming 
subsistence ac t iv i t i e s . r 
threatened. (Scott, j| I 
Entrepreneu Benefit from land Offer bribes to the Extend thei r 
T^ok a distant stand common pract ise to by bribes and j 
on the issue. exchange for tax 
concessions and building. 




. h 二 i n ； 
‘pol i t i c s like 
I elections. . 
Results of Peasants' d e m a n d j Cadres can get away Competition 
contestat io responded by cadres unless complaint by of di f ferent 
n only when they were peasants. Those who loca l i t i es 
organized； material found guil ty may be f o ^ s； 
義亭二疒 i 許 二 ^ S S e ： 
and l ibera l 
areas where | 
lj j more generous i| 
tax cuts are 
g i V e
"
 ; 
、 Unfair deals 
. with cadres, 
|j 丨 if uncovered, 
targets of 
complaint of | 
I peasants, || 
、 X19 
..‘‘ . i . ： I 
丨 . 、 1 I 
n p ^ 1 1 j； 
Results in Informal rules on 工riormal rules on Development 
i n s t i t u t i on proportion of land open bidding
 o t ie
g，x [ 
al changes in teres ts among evolved. Inadequate me^ns to 
township, xiang and ins t i tu t ional iza t10 solve ‘ | 
vi l lage developed. n as the economic _ } 
More serious supervisory ccpnt丄icts or ：丨 
implementation of land organization and different 
laws. Villagers judiciary are not par t ies , 
increase in teres ts in autonomous. 
collective welfare. Autonomy of these 
Evolution of vil lage organizations and 
collective n system. awareness of legal 
r ights of peasants 
； . need, to be 
strengthened for 
further 
ins t i tu t iona l i za t io 
. n. - - = = 5 : : : = = = = 1 
5 .2 A FOUR PLAYERS' MODEL • 
From our case studues, outcomes of contestation among 
po l i t i ca l players and inst i tut ional changes are not total ly 
determined by the inst i tut ional constraints. I t is also 
affected by the strategy of players. In the LancT disputes-and 
cases of complaints against cadres corruption, peasants could 
achieve their objectives when they could get the provincial 
government on the i r side, which depended in turn on the 
current of pol i t ica l campaigns. As for entrepreneurs, their 
in teres ts could only be protected by local cadres if the 
peasants at the local i t ies did not successfully complaint 
against t h e i r bribing. A four player model may be deducted for 
studying the outcomes of contestation. 
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TAE^LE 5 .2 FOUR PLAYERS MODEL FOR POLITICAL OUTCOMES j. 
i “:: 
I Players Resources"" I Possible strategy Outcomes 1 
(Number： Strength of demobilization 丨 
of Resources) (of opponents 丨  
resources) and Fi 
I coali t ion formation 
Provincial/ * Appointments G-P： curbed down on I Result： Peasant 
centra l for local cadres. local cadres abuses gamed par t i a l 
government * Selective if peasants highly success. 
(G) implementation of discontent, and \\ 
1 central policies mobilized. 
of controls. Refrained from too f 
！ * party strong actions for 
j Disciplinary fear of losing ‘ 丨  
Committee. local cadres 丨 
• Judiciary and cooperations. I 
administrative 
！ powers. (4) G-C： when a high . 
growth objective is 
needed and to 
！ silence opposition | 
j from peasants. I 
！ Demobilized !j 
I peasants resources 
by making the i r I ！| 
mobilization li 
， U l e “ ' 
L o c a l c a d r e s * Management of C-P： cooperative Res^ilt: Non-^ H 
a? townshir collecfive . measures to smooth - P ^ - ^ f
l o n
 |! 
^ f ( c ) 二 U = - t 二 二 C — one f 
levels * D i s c r e t i o n on peasants support, Cellular 
tax and fees. can form a stronger interest formed. 
* Control of protective "cell" ！ 
information. against possible 
* Threats of central !i 
po l i t i ca l interventions. ！ j 
suppression and , ^ 、 ：• 
repr i sa ls . C-G： (as above) 丨 丨丨 
|| * Network with 丨  
upper level C-E： Symbiosis 
cadres. (5) relat ions, improve ； 
I  incomes and 丨 
?! performances | l| 
indicator for 
cadres. 9 
Peasants (P) * Mobilization by P-C： as above. 
protests . P-G: as above. 
* Claims of 
• * Elections of 丨 丨 
vil lage ；！ 
j committee. (3) | I » 
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Entrepreneur • Bribes to local E-C： as above' to Results： 
s (E) cadres. get favourable possible 
* Threats of policy discret ion complaints from-
molbility of and other support peasants. 
investment. from cadres . 
* Legal n 
protection for E-C-P： more stable Results： stable 
property r ights . coali t ion to local in teres ts 
(3) prevent peasants' coali t ion, but. 
complaints on only possible in j 
‘ corruptions, by areas of 
sharing in teres ts affluence . 
and rent incomes 
with peasants . 
As i l lu s t r a t ed above, the pol i t ics of rural China in reform 
era i s defined in issues of contestation of material interests 
of di f ferent players. Even though contestation may be taken in 
the form for p r o t e c t i o n collective rights, or under pol i t ica l 
banners l ike
 n
anti-corruption"；the underlying objectives for 
the players are s t i l l material is t ic rather than moralistic. 
This i s ref lected in the cases of peasant mobilization in 
Township X where ac t iv i s t s were more interested in the outcome 
than the principles involved in the campaign. 
5.3 THEORY ON POLITICAL OUTCOMES 
The chances of success of the players mainly depend on their 
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strategy of coalition： 
f * Chances of supcess increase with successful formation of 
coal i t ion with another player. 
Another aspects of players' strategy is demobilization of — 
opponents' resources and mobilization of the i r own resources. 
* Tactical players will demobilize the resources of their 
opponents to increase their chances of winning. 
. T h e number of kinds of resources controlled by local cadres 
are more than that of peasants and entrepreneurs, unt i l there 
are changes in state ins t i tu t ions in future. Moreover, 
resources of peasants are less e a s y f o r mobilization and more 
prone to demobilization by their opponents. As a result , 
peasants are in a general vulnerable position. 
* Different coalit ion formation will resul t in different 
po l i t i c a l outcomes . 、 
From the case , studies/ the best peasants can achieve is a P-C-
/ E coali t ion where they can share incomes from collective 
resources. In th i s case they can at ta in economic rather than 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . This i s something l ike 
" inst i tu t ional ized/ group clientelism" where peasants are in 
g e n e r a l i z e d exchange with local cadres： giving pol i t ica l ' 
supports when received economic benefits . 
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5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Field case studies give important insights to understand new 
development inn the society and help us to c oncep t ua l i z e those 
changes. However, due to the limit of scope of research and 
lack of comparative data, we need to pay cautions to 
generalize r e s u l t s from case studies. For the present case, 
[ limited generalizations may be made to understand the s t a t e - ： 
society relations in affluent rural areas in Guangdong 
province characterized by decentralized state policies. 
工f we want t o verify t he hypo thes i s posed i n > e chapter, and 
, t o extent the scope of generalization of the thesis, 
comparative studies in other parts of China needed to be 
t a k e n . This may be carried out by two different approaches. 
Fi rs t , we can s tar t with studying local i t ies with different 
character is t ics . More local i t ies in China with different 
c a d r e - e n t r e p r e n e u r s , c ad r e -pea san t s , c e n t r a l l o c a l r e l a t i o n s 
need to be studied to determine to what extent the theory 
- . a p p l i e s to other parts of China. For example, areas like Jiasu 
w h e r e e n t e r p r i s e s were r e a l l y co l l e c t i v e l y -owned r a t h e r than 
騰 r e l y l i c e n s ed , or i n a r ea s where c e n t r a l c o n t r o l of f i s c a l 
and investment policies are stronger. 
Press. 
\ Another methodology for further research is a comparative 
1
 study approach of rural conflicts. A quantitative study of 
peasants' complaints to the Peoples' Congress or Provincial 
Party Committee and their resolution. Comparison can then be 
conducted on different forms of peasants' governmental and 
local cadres strategy and the outcome of contestation. The、 
same methodology can be applied to comparative study of 
corporatist strategy of local cadres. Different arrangements 
of corporatist measures of different local i t ies can be studied 
to understand the correlations of different factors. 
The framework of multi-level analysis for state-society 
relat ions, hypothesis for Insti tutional developments, 
derivation of pol i t ica l issues' players and games outcomes, 
however, may be t r i e d on cases outside China . They may be 
tested against country experiences of structural and socio-
economic changes . 
Press. 
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